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ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RURAL AMERICA
ANN M. EISENBERG*
ABSTRACT
Rural America today is at a crossroads. Widespread socioeconomic
decline outside cities has fueled the idea that rural communities have been
“left behind.” The question is whether these “left behind” localities should
be allowed to dwindle out of existence, or whether intervention to attempt
rural revitalization is warranted. Many advocate non-intervention because
rural lifestyles are inefficient to sustain. Others argue that, even if the nation
wanted to help, it lacks the law and policy tools to redirect rural America’s
course effectively.
This Article argues that we do have the law and policy tools necessary
to address rural socioeconomic marginalization and that we neglect to use
those tools to our own collective detriment. The Article focuses specifically
on the tool of economic regulation, meaning government oversight of entry,
exit, and participation parameters for service providers in certain markets.
Robust historical precedents establish that strategic economic regulation is
uniquely capable of sustaining rural communities, and that using it to do so
is in fact critical to national resilience.
Rural diseconomies of scale—the problem of higher costs per capita and
lower demand for resources in population-sparse regions—must be
understood as a keystone question concerning whether and how rural
communities can gain access to the amenities they need to survive. The pre1970s regulatory regime governing infrastructure industries helped
overcome the problem of diseconomies of scale by safeguarding rural
access to services that precede economic growth. Infrastructure industries’
subsequent abandonment of rural America during the deregulatory era
amounts to a market failure because the nation remains dependent on rural
communities for food and energy production, environmental stewardship,
political stability, and retreat from urbanism. Thus, for the benefit of all, a
broader conception of infrastructure and corrective interventions into
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. For thoughtful
feedback on various iterations of this project, I thank Tony Arnold, Derek Black, Josh Macey, Lisa
Pruitt, Claire Raj, Laurie Ristino, Wyatt Sassman, Emily Suski, Shelley Welton, and participants at the
2019 University of Colorado Boulder Law School/U.C. Santa Barbara School of Environment Annual
Works in Progress Symposium, the 2019 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Works-in-Progress
Session, the 2019 Intersectional Environmentalism Workshop at the University of Colorado Boulder
Law School, the 2019 Annual Sustainability Conference of American Legal Educators at Arizona State
University College of Law, and the University of South Carolina School of Law faculty workshops.
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infrastructure markets must help connect rural America to communitysustaining systems like broadband internet and national grocery store
chains. Ultimately, this discussion also offers an answer to the problem of
the so-called “urban/rural divide”: enhancing “urban/rural connection,”
both literally and symbolically.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the country, communities outside major urban centers are no
longer sustained by livelihoods in agriculture, natural resource extraction,
and manufacturing.1 Many of these communities are instead weakening by
attrition as population and wealth flow toward regions with growing modern
industries.2 After the Great Recession of 2008, rural America fell below
zero population growth for the first time in the country’s history.3 This and
other trends—high rates of rural “deaths of despair” by suicide and opioids,
high rates of rural unemployment, and high approval rates among rural
voters of President Trump’s isolationist rhetoric—have prompted

1.
Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and Rural America, 61 B.C. L. REV. 189, 206–10
(2020).
2.
Id. at 214; Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 187–88, 194–
96 (2018) (discussing causes and effects of rural depopulation); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the
War of Attrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline, and Infrastructure, 127 YALE L.J.F. 522, 522 (2017)
(discussing rural depopulation during postwar period, as well as challenges faced by those unable to
move); Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America,
59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 481, 481 n.53 (2014) (discussing recent trend of population loss in rural America
and young people’s tendency to move to cities).
3.
John Cromartie, Rural Areas Show Overall Population Decline and Shifting Regional
Patterns of Population Change, AMBER WAVES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves
/2017/september/rural-areas-show-overall-population-decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-popula
tion-change/ [https://perma.cc/DRJ9-4YZU].
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commentators to deem these regions as increasingly “left behind” in the
calculus of national economic development.4
The question before the country is whether these trends should be left to
run their course. Should these “left behind” localities be allowed to dwindle
out of existence? Or is some form of intervention warranted to stop or
reverse large-scale patterns of rural socioeconomic decline? 5 Many
advocate non-intervention, insisting that the rural way of life is simply too
inefficient to sustain and that rural populations—still about one seventh of
the national population 6 —should instead be incentivized or helped to
relocate en masse to cities.7 Proponents of this view tend to insist both that
nothing should be done to address rural decline, but also that nothing can
be done—namely, no set of tools in law and policy is positioned to
counteract the worldwide tidal waves of globalization, automation, and
urbanization that drive these patterns.8
4.
See Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 241, 248 (2018) (“[T]he diseases and deaths of despair (suicide, chronic substance abuse,
overdose) are both more prevalent and more deadly for rural populations.”); Lisa R. Pruitt, The Women
Feminism Forgot: Rural and Working-Class White Women in the Era of Trump, 49 U. TOL. L. REV. 537,
564 (2018) (suggesting that “lack of economic opportunity fueled [rural] working-class voter migration
toward Trump.”). For sociological literature examining rural voting patterns and socioeconomic trends,
see ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA (2018); ARLIE
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN
RIGHT (2016); LOKA ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY: WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING THE
TRUST OF RURAL AMERICA (2018); KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016); Paige Kelly & Linda Lobao,
The Social Bases of Rural-Urban Political Divides: Social Status, Work, and Sociocultural Beliefs, 84
RURAL SOCIO. 669 (2019); see also Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REV. 151,
221 (2020) (observing that failure to secure adequate trade adjustment programs to correspond with
liberalized trade arrangements mean that those who lose out in liberalized trade (mostly rural
communities) will continue to oppose it); Clara Hendrickson, Mark Muro & William A. Galston,
Countering the Geography of Discontent: Strategies for Left-Behind Places, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-the-geography-of-discontent-strategies-for-left-behind
-places/ [https://perma.cc/8YSN-QYCF]; cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD RURAL POLICY
REVIEWS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RURAL SERVICE DELIVERY 24 (2010) (across OECD countries in
Europe, remote rural regions show negative population growth, lower share of national Gross Domestic
Product, lower Gross Domestic Product per capita, and lower sectoral productivity).
5.
Cf. Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline
.html [https://perma.cc/8UTV-MUDX].
6.
ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2018 EDITION
3 (2018) (rural America includes fourteen percent of national population).
7.
Cf. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE
L.J. 78, 82–85, 141–45 (2017) (arguing that policy approaches to geographic inequality should focus on
removing barriers to mobility rather than place-based investments); David Swenson, Most of America’s
Rural Areas Are Doomed to Decline, THE CONVERSATION (May 7, 2019, 7:20 AM), http://theconversati
on.com/most-of-americas-rural-areas-are-doomed-to-decline-115343 [https://perma.cc/AU3S-DMV7].
8.
See, e.g., Swenson, supra note 7 (arguing that “what to do about rural economic and
persistent population decline is the one area that has always confounded” presidential candidates visiting
Iowa); Porter, supra note 5 (“One thing seems clear to me: nobody—not experts or policymakers or
people in these communities—seems to know quite how to pick rural America up.”).
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As a threshold matter, this Article insists that intervention is indeed
warranted and that in fact, we fail to nurture rural livelihoods to our own
collective detriment. Rural communities remain essential to a functioning,
resilient nation. 9 The full spectrum of rural communities’ worth and
potential is outside the Article’s scope. But the current and possible
contributions of the small towns and remote counties characterized by
greater expanses of land and sparser populations are not insignificant. 10
Rural communities and workers produce the bulk of the nation’s food and
energy and steward eighty percent of the country’s land mass and its
associated ecosystem services.11 They are an integral part of the national
political community.12 In the face of the COVID-19 crisis, they have offered
an alternative to urban lifestyles that have become newly stressed, where
skyrocketing housing costs were already prohibitive for many.13 The need
to intervene stems not from nostalgia for a mythologized, antiquated rural
idyll, but more from the urgency of envisioning a healthy and modernized
rural future as a necessary part of an interdependent national system.14
9.
Laurie Ristino, Surviving Climate Change in America: Toward a Rural Resilience
Framework, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 521, 525–30 (2019).
10.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 199–200 (discussing definitions of rural as characterized by lower
population density and distance from urban centers).
11.
Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 20, 56 (calling for improvements in
place-based rural investments and service delivery because of incremental benefits to society as a whole,
including taking advantage of human and natural resources located in rural areas); Ristino, supra note
9, at 522–28 (arguing rural America has key role to play in national resilience and is neglected to our
collective detriment because it is locus of nation’s food and fiber provisioning, as well as ecosystem
services including clean air, clean water, climate mitigation functions, and biodiversity).
12.
See generally Rick Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 837 (2020).
13.
See, e.g., Ruth Bender, Escape to the Country: Why City Living Is Losing Its Appeal During
the Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/escape-to-the-cou
ntry-why-city-living-is-losing-its-appeal-during-the-pandemic-11592751601 [https://perma.cc/S2FGHQNV]; Elizabeth A. Andrews & Jesse Reiblich, Reflections on Rural Resilience: As the Climate
Changes, Will Rural Areas Become the Urban Backyard?, 44 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.
745, 774 (2020).
14.
Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3. Recent devastating Australian
bushfires that killed dozens of people and millions of animals provide a tragic example of rural
significance: intensive indigenous controlled burning practices might have helped prevent or mitigate
the fires, but the largely urbanized Australian population has been dismissive of these traditions. Jason
Scott, There’s a 60,000-Year-Old Way to Help Stop Australia Burning, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-16/there-s-a-60-000-year-old-way-to-he
lp-stop-australia-burning [https://perma.cc/TT7H-9579]. For analysis on comparable tensions in the
United States, see Tony Marks-Block, Frank K. Lake & Lisa M. Curran, Effects of Understory Fire
Management Treatments on California Hazelnut, an Ecocultural Resource of the Karuk and Yurok
Indians in the Pacific Northwest, 450 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 1 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.c
om/science/article/pii/S0378112719306826?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/7RFR-B5ER]; FOREST
SERV. PAC. SW. REGION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SOMES BAR INTEGRATED FIRE MANAGEMENT
PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa
/106291_FSPLT3_4291171.pdf [https://perma.cc/9554-UDA9]; Mejs Hasan, Native Tribes Are Taking
Fire Control into Their Own Hands, WIRED (Aug. 9, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/wild
fires-native-tribes-controlled-burns/ [https://perma.cc/NLU5-95X4]; see also Stephen R. Miller et al.,
Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface, ADVOCATE, June–July 2016, at 42.
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More centrally, the Article argues that the idea that we lack the law and
policy tools to counteract rural socioeconomic decline overlooks important
historical precedents that are critical to informing a more fruitful and
equitable path forward.15 This discussion focuses on the tool of economic
regulation, or government oversight of entry, exit, and participation
parameters for service providers in certain industries.16 In particular, the
regulatory apparatus governing infrastructure industries for the century
from the 1880s to the 1970s reveals the unique power of economic
regulation to support and sustain rural communities.17
This argument about the import of economic regulation to rural
communities has four components. First, rural diseconomies of scale—the
higher costs per capita and lower returns on investment associated with rural
service provision due to lower population density—must be understood as
a keystone question as to whether and how rural communities can gain
access to the services and resources they need to survive. 18 Rural
communities’ struggle to achieve economies of scale means they are
naturally disadvantaged in attracting most types of resources, ranging from
public education funding to hospitals to private housing developers. 19
Limited access to fundamental amenities, such as affordable transportation
and broadband internet, plays a substantial role in today’s rural

15.
See generally William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 721 (2018).
16.
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 364 (2004) (differentiating economic regulation
(interventions into markets) and social regulation (“aimed at enhancing health, safety, environmental
quality, equal opportunity, and quality of life”)); see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998)
(differentiating economic from social regulation and observing unique relevance of economic regulation
to “six core regulated industries” including common carriers (railroads, airlines, trucks, and
telecommunications companies) and public utilities (electricity and natural gas)).
17.
See discussion infra Section II.A; see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and
the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 911, 913 (2018) (defining infrastructure as “those goods and
services that are essential, upon which much of our economic and social life are built. While
conventionally the idea of ‘infrastructure’ might evoke images of roads and bridges, the concept is much
broader . . . also describ[ing] a wider range of goods and services, which together operate at scale, enable
widespread downstream uses, and thus serve as foundational necessities for economic and social life.”).
18.
See discussion infra Part I; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 24, 26–27; Janice
Probst, Jan Marie Eberth & Elizabeth Crouch, Structural Urbanism Contributes to Poorer Health
Outcomes for Rural America, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1976, 1980 (2019) (describing inefficiencies stemming
from population sparseness and greater distances as barriers to effective rural service provision).
19.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 194; Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 282–
83 (2003); Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty
and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Pruitt, Spatial Inequality]; see also Lisa R. Pruitt
& Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 219, 312 (2010) (discussing delivery of indigent defense services) [hereinafter Pruitt & Colgan,
Justice Deserts]; Probst et al., supra note 18.
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socioeconomic challenges.20 The question of whether to maintain or extend
such amenities to under-served communities largely drives the conversation
on whether rural populations can or should be sustained at all.21 A common
instinct is to direct scarce resources to population centers that offer greater
returns on investment for more recipients, raising the question of whether,
how, and why rural communities can be adequately served despite
appearing not to offer the “best” use of resources.
Second, the regime regulating infrastructure industries from the 1880s to
the late twentieth century showed that measures to ensure rural access to the
services that precede economic growth were key to protecting and
cultivating rural communities. 22 In other words, this regime helped
overcome the natural barrier rural diseconomies of scale pose to accessing
the infrastructure that any community needs to thrive. 23 The term,
“infrastructure,” can describe “a wide range of goods and services”;
throughout U.S. history, the infrastructure concept has encompassed at one
time even the provision of milk. 24 But much of the discussion of this
regulatory genre focuses on what were once known as the regulated
industries, including common carriers (trains, trucks, buses, and airlines)
and utilities (telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas).25
Until relatively recently, economic regulatory policies embraced the idea
that rural communities, in light of their remoteness and smaller populations,
needed protection from service providers’ unilateral, profit-driven decisionmaking, which would tend to motivate those providers either not to serve

20.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 225–26; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3, 16
(observing that all OECD countries, including the United States, face a significant challenge to ensure
“that rural residents and firms have access to an appropriate set of public and private services,” without
which development potential can be limited; “[w]hen statistics are collected and compared using
different types of territory, it is usually possible to see if there are differences in the level of service
available across places. In general we find fewer and weaker services in rural than in urban regions.”);
Probst et al., supra note 18, at 1979 (discussing biases in health care toward large population centers).
21.
Cf. Schleicher, supra note 7, at 106, 113 (observing problem arising from mismatch between
state and local fiscal capacity to provide services and residents’ needs for such services); Shelley Welton
& Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 307, 325–
28 (2019) (noting the question of whether rural communities should be cross-subsidized by urban ones).
22.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
23.
See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235
(2003) [hereinafter Dempsey, Legal History]; Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation:
Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, The Dark Side];
Edwin B. Parker, Closing the Digital Divide in Our Rural America, 24 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 281, 282
(2000) (“[T]he two major barriers to rural economic growth are distance and lack of economies of scale
. . . .”).
24.
K. Sabeel Rahman, Challenging the New Curse of Bigness, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 2016, at 68,
70; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16.
25.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 1327 (analyzing past twenty-five years of changes
in economic regulation of common carriers and public utilities).
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rural communities or to charge them substantially higher prices.26 Under the
germinal 1887 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) and subsequent regimes
enacted for a variety of industries, common carriers and public utilities were
bound by a principle of non-discrimination among localities and mandates
to provide universal service at “just and reasonable” rates. 27 Crosssubsidization and resource bundling helped to finance entry into lessprofitable places. 28 These protections were understood at the time as
anticipating and preventing the potential for markets to fail to provide
sufficient services to small and remote communities; failing to serve such
communities was seen as both unfair and contrary to national interests.29
Equitable rural access to infrastructure services in turn promoted the growth
of local and regional economies and connected rural communities, literally
and symbolically, to the rest of the country.30
Third, the deregulatory era then served to prune small and remote
localities off the national systems on which they depended. Following a
“vigorous and sustained critique” of existing regulations, reforms such as
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the Staggers Rail Act and Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, and other developments in transportation and
telecommunications in particular replaced principles of non-discrimination
and universal service with regimes favoring competition.31 Proponents of
deregulation insisted—arguably unrealistically—that market-driven
regimes would still serve the aim of providing universal service.32 Yet, with
the elimination of strong mandates to serve rural communities, markets
largely redirected services to more populated areas that wielded providers
more profits.33 After widespread and abrupt departures by common carriers,
for instance, this transformation left rural communities to “wither on the
vine” or die “like a human limb or organ starved of oxygen by an artery
26.
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B; see also, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 3,877–78 (1886)
(senators discussing need to account for disadvantages for rural and remote locales in accessing fair
railroad rates); Michal S. Gal, Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition
Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (2001); Anderson, supra note 2, at 538 (discussing inevitability
of decline where “weak cities” are left by federal and state governments to address infrastructure
spending as a local task). See generally Boyd, supra note 15.
27.
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379. See generally Kearney
& Merrill, supra note 16, at 1331–32.
28.
See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 1328; Meyer, supra note 4, at 184–85.
29.
17 CONG. REC. 3,877–78 (1886) (discussion among Senators about fairness to residents of
interior states in benefiting from equal railroad tariffs, and also highlighting concerns about facilitating
low-cost export of crops produced in such states for national benefit).
30.
See Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 458–59.
31.
William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 45 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10788, 10791 (2015); Boyd, supra note 15, at 727; Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49
U.S.C. § 1301; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10101; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. §
10101.
32.
See Boyd, supra note 15, at 727; Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 454.
33.
Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 455.
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made impassable by a tenacious blood clot.”34 In light of continued rural
importance to national interests, these infrastructure industries’
abandonment of rural communities during this era should be viewed as a
series of market failures that now warrant correction.35
Fourth and finally, embracing a new conception of infrastructure can
help reconnect rural communities to the national systems that they need to
survive through corrective interventions into infrastructure markets. This
Article focuses on the rural relationship to transportation and
telecommunications markets in particular as prominent historic instances of
economic regulation and subsequent deregulation.36 This discussion can in
turn illuminate the role for economic regulation of markets allocating other
important resources, such as energy, healthcare, and even access to grocery
stores.37 In order for policymakers to fully understand and meet the needs
of rural communities, the concept of “infrastructure” should be broadened.
Strategic interventions to correct infrastructure markets that exclude or
disadvantage rural communities will in turn serve the dual goal of
counteracting the cycle of rural socioeconomic decline while furthering
national resilience.38
Two overarching points contextualize these arguments. First, the effects
of deregulation are a missing piece of today’s dominant narrative about rural
decline. Many attribute rural decline to organic operations of markets or
34.
Id. at 446, 463 (“Unfortunately, the literature criticizing the previous regime of regulation,
and applauding the benefits of deregulation, tends to gloss over one of deregulation’s major costs—its
impact upon individuals who reside in America’s small towns and rural communities.”); id. at 447
(“Transportation was the first American industry to be regulated and, paradoxically, the first to be
significantly deregulated.”); Paul W. Barkley, The Effects of Deregulation on Rural Communities, 70
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1091, 1093–95 (1988); Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 238, 239–40
(“Any region, which loses access to the [transportation] system, and thereby the means to participate in
the broader market for the exchange of goods and services, will wither on the vine.”).
35.
Cf. John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 509–
10 (2019) (providing “brief primer” on market-failure approach, where “market failure occurs when the
relevant market produces outcomes that are less efficient than they might be,” with efficiency generally
measured as whether losers in transitions are somehow compensated for their losses).
36.
See generally Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23 (discussing the regulation and
deregulation of transportation).
37.
Cf. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1620
(2014) (arguing that “a revitalized notion of public utility—one that sees it less as an obstacle to markets
and innovation and more as an ‘instrument of the commonwealth’—could play an important role in the
effort to secure a low-carbon future”). Unique legal regimes shaping sectors such as energy also suggest
that they are worthy of their own, separate inquiry as it relates to this Article’s themes. Rural
communities arguably bounced back from energy deregulation more than in other sectors; the
proliferation of rural electricity cooperatives filled in much of the vacuum left by firms’ exit. See
generally Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Democracy and Dysfunction: Rural
Electric Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the Separation of Ownership and Control, 70
ALA. L. REV. 361 (2018) (discussing the benefits of Rural Electric Cooperatives).
38.
Cf. Rahman, supra note 24, at 69–70 (noting revived interest today in the public utility
tradition and arguing that historical public utility concepts can be adapted across various modern
regulatory policy debates).
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other faceless culprits, such as globalization and automation. 39 This
discussion shows that rural decline was undoubtedly in part a foreseeable
consequence of a large-scale movement to favor consumer choice and
service providers’ profits over measures designed to actively sustain rural
communities and the positive externalities that they generate. 40 It seems
almost disingenuous for a country to facilitate a mass exit of the
infrastructure services necessary for economic stability and growth from
entire regions, and then to lament those regions’ isolation and lack of
economic viability.41
Second, this discussion is also central to questions surrounding the
“urban/rural divide” that stymies commentators today. 42 The need to
reconnect rural America to national systems is discussed here in a literal
sense as to actual, physical systems—rural communities are
disproportionately cut off from services like broadband internet
infrastructure, a utility which most agree today is what electricity was a
century ago. 43 But the need to reconnect rural communities to national
systems is also meant in a more allegorical sense. Rural communities are
isolated not just physically, but also culturally, politically, and

39.
See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 193 (discussing dominant discourse in which rural decline is
“no one’s fault”); cf. Boyd, supra note 37, at 1620 (arguing that “a broader notion of public utility offers
a possible normative and conceptual frame for moving beyond the false separation of markets and
regulation”); Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 132 (2018) (discussing tenet of New Brandeisian movement that “[t]here
are no such thing as market ‘forces’” and that “the political economy is structured only through law and
policy”).
40.
See Boyd, supra note 37, at 1620 (describing “sustained intellectual assault” from 1960s
forward mounted by economists and lawyers that served to diminish the notion of the import of the
public utility).
41.
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 26, 35 (noting that “[t]ransport
infrastructure policies have been commonly used by governments as the main means to improve
accessibility to remote peripheral areas and to promote economic development. . . . [G]ood
infrastructural endowment is essential to achieve economic growth” and “[t]he availability of certain
services has . . . become a pre-condition for the viability of a particular place”); Schleicher, supra note
7, at 145 (differentiating between prosperous regions and stagnant ones); Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan
Ricks & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3527055 (noting that the effects of
deregulation on geographic inequality have been predictable but too often unacknowledged).
42.
See generally Emily Badger, How the Rural-Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault
Line, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/upshot/americapolitical-divide-urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/9YWB-9BXM] (providing background on the
urban/rural divide).
43.
See LIFT America: Modernizing Our Infrastructure for the Future: Hearing on H.R. 2741
Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of David A. Lyons, Professor,
B.C. L. Sch.); 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, FCC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-r
esearch/reports/broadband-progress-reports/2018-broadband-deployment-report [https://perma.cc/JZ4T
-F6QW] (showing 70% of rural and 64% of Tribal areas had access to broadband internet compared to
90.5% in urban areas).
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rhetorically.44 It seems natural, in fact, that a response to the “urban/rural
divide” should involve “urban/rural reconnection.”45
These proposals raise several important questions, in addition to everpresent political obstacles to reform. What about unfairness to urban
communities and the environmental problems associated with directing
scarce resources to sparser populations?46 What about critiques of economic
regulation, ranging from promoting inefficiency and consumer costs to
problems with the accountability and effectiveness of the administrative
apparatus that enforces them? 47 Does it matter that rural voters tend to
disfavor government intervention, and that this Article’s proposals would
likely not be embraced by a majority of rural residents? 48 Even if
interventions were pursued, how would policymakers make difficult
choices about where to intervene, given that not all rural communities could
be salvaged or revitalized?
These concerns are addressed throughout the Article. Significantly, these
proposals are not presented as mere altruism for potentially skeptical rural
communities, but as an important part of a collective problem. This
44.
While much of the commentary on rural America today focuses on the alienation of the white
rural working- and middle-class, physical, cultural, and economic isolation are also deep concerns for
rural communities of color. Rural communities of color in poverty in the United States quite literally
experience some of the worst living conditions in the developed world. Philip Alston, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Hum. Rts., Statement on Visit to the USA, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUM. RTS. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Ne
wsID=22533 [https://perma.cc/EY8L-PSF4]; see also Maybell Romero, Viewing Access to Justice for
Rural Mainers of Color Through a Prosecution Lens, 71 ME. L. REV. 227, 228, 234–35 (2019)
(discussing limited access to justice for rural communities of color).
45.
See Bill Lindeke, Intercity Rail Would Bridge Minnesota’s So-Called “Rural-Urban
Divide,” STREETS.MN (Feb. 24, 2020), https://streets.mn/2020/02/24/intercity-rail-would-bridge-minnes
otas-so-called-rural-urban-divide/ [https://perma.cc/4GYM-8LBQ] (suggesting that an intercity railway
would bridge the rural/urban divide by facilitating travel between smaller and larger cities); Sheryll D.
Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to
New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2048 (2000) (arguing that although equity has been most important
justification for devolved governance, localist strategies dependent on voluntary cooperation fall victim
to power dynamics that fuel regional inequities); Steve Craig, “The More They Listen, the More They
Buy” Radio and the Modernizing of Rural America, 1930–1939, 80 AGRIC. HIST. 1, 3 (2006) (“As radio
helped dispel rural isolation, it also served to convey and reinforce the notion of a single, American
national identity.”); RICHARD J. ORSI, SUNSET LIMITED: THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN WEST (2005) (development of rail system prompted corporations to
view United States as unified national economy rather than series of regional economies).
46.
David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why We Should Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J.F.
571, 579 n.34 (2017); cf. KATE ARANOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & THEA
RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL 129 (2019) (describing
“urbanists’ chauvinist fantasy that we could all live in Manhattan-like cities, walking and biking
everywhere with a tote bag loaded with ramps, smiling smugly at our green virtuosity”).
47.
See Boyd, supra note 31, at 10791–92 (detailing critiques of economic regulatory
frameworks); Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235,
237 (2014).
48.
Cf. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 8–10 (discussing conservative rural voting patterns despite
apparent rural need for increased government assistance).
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discussion is also not merely a call to turn back the clock on regulation.49
Varied means may accomplish the ends this discussion insists are necessary;
if means other than regulation could accomplish those ends, those means
should be considered too.50 The discussion draws upon K. Sabeel Rahman’s
formula for conceptualizing modernized regulatory interventions in this era
of “the new utilities.”51 Of course, any intervention will not be a panacea
for widespread rural decline. Complementary policy efforts—such as
increased anti-poverty initiatives, assistance for local governments, and
planning for economic diversification—would need to be pursued in tandem
with the proposals presented here if large-scale rural revitalization were to
be achieved.52
In sum, this Article reveals that the need for legal intervention to ensure
better service provision to rural communities is not merely a question of
sentimentality, or even morality. We isolate and neglect rural communities
to our own collective detriment. Infrastructure markets that exclude or
disadvantage rural communities are not markets functioning optimally. The
persistent challenge of limited rural economies of scale is a central, yet
underappreciated keystone of this puzzle. It is past time to contemplate more
robust, modernized interventions into infrastructure markets to counter rural
communities’ natural disadvantages, reconnect rural communities to the rest
of the country, and help pursue a more resilient future in an era of poignant
interdependence.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines “rural,” describes
modern rural conditions associated with widespread rural socioeconomic
decline, and argues that diseconomies of scale are central to understanding
today’s rural challenges. Part II illustrates the unique power of economic
regulation to sustain rural communities, tracing rural America’s
development from the late nineteenth century to the present and focusing on
the role of regulation and deregulation of the transportation and
telecommunications sectors in shaping rural welfare. This Part argues that
49.
Cf. Rahman, supra note 17, at 915 (arguing that historical public utility concepts need to be
adapted to policy debates of the current moment).
50.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 12 (suggesting that “we should not assume
that only one type of service provider can provide a specific service”); see also Boyd, supra note 15, at
728 (contemplating whether “ideas of just price or public utility or economic justice could . . . be
refashioned and redeployed in the face of current challenges”).
51.
K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival
of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668–69 (2018).
52.
See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 220, 238 (advocating increased external support for rural local
governments to provide basic services like building code enforcement); Eisenberg, supra note 1, 198–
99 (advocating fairer allocations of resources to rural communities, including more robust anti-poverty
efforts in light of rural poverty’s disproportionately chronic nature); Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions,
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 330 (2019) (calling for sustainable economic diversification initiatives in rural
communities historically reliant on mono-economies now in decline).
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infrastructure industries’ abandonment of rural communities in the
deregulatory era amounts to a series of market failures because of how this
abandonment undermined the many important positive externalities
associated with rural development. Part III argues that in light of ongoing
rural importance to national interests, more robust consideration of
modernized market-correcting mechanisms is warranted for nurturing rural
communities’ economic growth and well-being, not just for transportation
and telecommunications, but also for other markets that exclude and
disadvantage rural communities. This Part proposes a broader conception
of the idea of “infrastructure” and offers a normative assessment of how
such interventions might be pursued.
I. RURAL CONDITIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
A. Rural Socioeconomic Decline
The question of the costs and benefits associated with a rural way of life
has taken on some increased urgency of late. Rural communities’ dramatic,
consistent declines in population and increases in socioeconomic problems
such as suicide, opioid addiction, and unemployment have all contributed
to a desire to understand what factors drive these phenomena and whether
they can or should be reversed or mitigated.53 After the 2016 election of
President Trump, commentary sought to understand his popularity with
white rural voters, bringing more attention to the “urban/rural divide”
associated with a wide set of issues ranging from racial polarization to
disparate access to technology.54
Although rural localities are diverse and variable—and it is important
not to fall into the trap of characterizing rural America as “a monolith in a
perpetual state of decline”55—certain trends can be seen across rural places.
The annual report of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Service, Rural America at a Glance, describes today’s rural
socioeconomic challenges. 56 The Report first defines rural as
“nonmetropolitan,” (nonmetro) a designation estimated to encompass 46.1
53.
See Hendrickson, Muro & Galston, supra note 4; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note
4, at 11 (noting that “[w]hile there has been a longstanding interest in rural services, the severity and
persistence of the recession has made the issue even more important. . . . [R]ural areas have been largely
left to adjust to the recession on the basis of their own resources,” even though they may be more
dependent on public support for services).
54.
See James Fallows, The Rural-Urban Divide Is More Complicated Than You Think, THE
ATL. (May 28, 2019, 11:48 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/05/rural-urban-divide-morecomplicated-you-think/590326/ [https://perma.cc/U2NM-QCTE].
55.
Ristino, supra note 9, at 528.
56.
ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2019 EDITION
(2019).
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million residents as of 2018, or 14.1 percent of the national population.57
This designation applies to places that have “some combination of: 1. open
countryside, 2. rural towns (places with fewer than 2,500 people), and 3.
urban areas with populations ranging from 2,500 to 49,999 that are not part
of larger labor market areas (metropolitan areas).”58 Counties designated
nonmetro can therefore contain substantial urban populations or be adjacent
to urban centers.59 From 2010 to 2018, populations grew in metropolitan
(metro) counties and in nonmetro counties containing urban populations,
while population declined in nonmetro counties without urban
populations. 60 Everywhere saw employment growth except for nonmetro
counties that lacked urban populations and were not adjacent to metro
areas.61 Growth was substantially slower in nonmetro counties generally.
The Report continues:
In addition to slower population growth, lower rates of labor force
participation in nonmetro areas—due to an older, less educated
population that is more likely to be disabled—also contributed to
slower employment growth in nonmetro than in metro areas. Poverty
rates are highest in the most rural, isolated settings, and the gap
between poverty rates in these and other settings has grown. . . .
Real personal income per person (PIPP) was significantly higher
and grew faster in metro counties than in nonmetro counties during
2010–17.62
In an effort to capture how these trends are distributed with more nuance,
sociologists Lawrence Hamilton et al. have suggested that today there are
“four rural Americas,” only one of which is prosperous. Those categories
include (1) amenity-rich rural America; (2) chronically poor rural America;
(3) resource-dependent, declining rural America; and (4) mixed
amenity/decline rural America.63 Underlying all of these categories is the
question of whether and how rural communities have economic activity to
sustain them. Amenity-rich rural America—which includes communities
that enjoy “natural splendor,” tourism activity, relative proximity to urban
centers, and higher property values—is in a better position to sustain
57.
Id. at 1–2.
58.
Rural Classifications: Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.er
s.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-classifications/ [https://perma.cc/7W99-GHPJ].
59.
ECON. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 1.
60.
Id. at 2.
61.
Id. at 2–3.
62.
Id. at 1.
63.
LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, LESLIE R. HAMILTON, CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN & CHRIS R.
COLOCOUSIS, PLACE MATTERS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FOUR RURAL AMERICAS 6
(2008).
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regional economic activity than its counterparts, while challenges with
sustainable economic activity characterize the other three categories.64
The second and third categories—declining resource-dependent
communities and communities suffering from chronic poverty—are
arguably the most distressed and in need of attention today. These types of
communities share some overlapping characteristics and some important
differences. Resource-dependent communities in decline would include the
timbering communities of the Pacific Northwest and deindustrializing
regions of the Midwest. These communities have mostly conservative,
white populations whose families have resided locally for multiple
generations.65 Communities struggling with chronic poverty, by contrast,
mostly include populations of color. These populations are concentrated in
African-American communities in the South, Native American reservations
in the West, and fast-growing Latinx communities throughout the country,
in addition to the majority-white populations of Appalachia.66
Although these categories of distressed rural localities may seem
fundamentally different in some ways, two points are worth noting. First,
white rural residents receive the lion’s share of attention in the public
discourse about “rural America.”67 But rural populations of color dealing
with chronic poverty quite literally experience some of the worst living
conditions in the developed world. 68 Second, resource-dependent rural
communities may seem relatively privileged; they, at least, had something
to lose in the first place by way of robust economic activity, unlike the
chronically impoverished communities. But the logical conclusion of
declining to intervene to mitigate or counteract these trends is that
communities in decline are on track to become chronically impoverished if
nothing is done. Across both categories, these populations are struggling
with substance abuse and mental health crises, high rates of unemployment,
and difficulty accessing services necessary to meet basic needs ranging from
healthcare to clean drinking water to libraries to building code
enforcement.69
The town of Cairo, Illinois, provides an illustrative example of what rural
distress can look like today. Cairo’s population was once 15,000, and it
grew and was constructed as a home for 15,000 people living at a hub of
river commerce.70 Cairo suffered as a result of competition from railway
and highway traffic and the loss of its largest employer, the Burkart Foam
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 6–17.
Id. at 4, 15.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 191.
See Alston, supra note 44.
See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 187–94.
Id. at 188.
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Company. 71 Today, Cairo’s population hovers just above 2,000. The
majority-Black residents have had to deal with a proliferation of empty and
dilapidated buildings, the closure of the town’s last grocery store in 2015,
and the condemnation of the town’s last public housing complex in 2017.72
Meanwhile, the prospect of local residents attracting new services and
amenities, like a new public housing complex, seems grim in light of the
lack of incentives for providers and developers.
A common proposal to address these problems is that, instead of
pursuing place-based policies, rural residents should relocate to regions with
more resources.73 Where barriers to mobility exist, our focus should, it is
argued, be on removing those barriers, rather than on efforts to revitalize
distressed places. Of course, removing barriers to mobility would keep those
seeking to relocate from being tethered to localities where they do not want
to be.74 But failing to acknowledge rural marginalization as a problem, and
a structural one that should be addressed, raises troubling ethical, political,
and logistical implications.75 It is not clear, for instance, that a better life
awaits residents relocating to cities, where housing costs and other
challenges—most recently including the pandemic-related dangers
associated with population density—may simply bring new forms of
suffering. 76 Although the prospect of attempting wholesale rural
71.
Id. at 194–95.
72.
Id. at 195–96; see also Kirk Siegler, ‘Nobody Cares About Cairo’: Residents of Shrinking
River Town Fight to Bring It Back, NPR (June 16, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/16/618
959048/nobody-cares-about-cairo-residents-of-shrinking-river-town-fight-to-bring-it-bac [https://perm
a.cc/T37P-74W4]; Kirk Siegler, Saving Cairo: A Once Thriving River Town Finds Itself On Life
Support, NPR (June 4, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/04/528650995/saving-cairo-a-onc
e-thriving-river-town-finds-itself-on-life-support [https://perma.cc/K5SJ-7AZ].
73.
See The “Just Move” Argument: Reflections on Distributive Justice, Mobility, and Rural
America, YOUTH CIRCULATIONS (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.youthcirculations.com/blog/2020/2/26/th
e-just-move-argument-reflections-on-distributive-justice-mobility-and-rural-america [https://perma.cc/
YG8Y-Z7XN] (referring to “the pervasive public claim that rural individuals should ‘just move’”).
74.
Cf. Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J.F. 498 (2017)
(acknowledging importance of mobility to reducing concentrated poverty and segregation).
75.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 542 (arguing that increasing geographic mobility is not
enough to address rising social inequality and calling for “new antipoverty agenda” and investments in
basic infrastructure in declining regions); Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility and the Persistence
of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J.F. 480, 487–90, 496–97 (2017) (discussing growing inequality within
metro regions that makes migration from struggling regions to megacities less desirable than it may
seem and questioning efficacy of “federal interventions that simply move people around”); Naomi
Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE L.J.F. 458, 479
(2017) (discussing being “strongly embedded” in a community as explaining choices not to move, as
opposed to more negative connotation of being “stuck”).
76.
See David Montgomery, The Neighborhoods Where Housing Costs Devour Budgets,
BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Apr. 4, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0404/mapping-where-housing-costs-hit-budgets-the-most [https://perma.cc/2VCR-RQQV] (detailing
problems in both rural and urban areas); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of
Textbook Theory and Empirical Reality, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 185, 230 n.170 (1992) (deregulation of bus
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revitalization may be both daunting and complicated, it is also problematic
to treat rural marginalization as nature simply running its course.77
At the broadest level, the discourse on rural communities today, in light
of their increasingly distressed conditions, seeks to understand how these
conditions came to be and what could be done to address them. The next
sections seek to illuminate those questions by linking today’s rural
conditions to the fundamental question of rural economies of scale.
Critically, this discourse has neglected the country’s past efforts to account
for rural diseconomies of scale and prevent the very form of rural stagnancy
that we see today; in turn, then, the solution to rural marginalization must
involve the question of rural diseconomies of scale.
B. Rural Diseconomies of Scale
The discussion in this section focuses on two important characteristics
of rurality: remoteness from an urban center and relatively low population
density. 78 Although definitions vary, the commonly understood
characteristic of rural communities is that they have relatively few people
living in a place that is relatively far from a population center and its
associated amenities. 79 For example, consistent with the Department of
Agriculture, the U.S. Census Bureau defines “rural” as anything that is not
“urban,” with “urbanized areas” defined as having a population of 50,000
or more, and “urban clusters” as having a population of between 2,500 and
50,000.80 Of course, small urban centers and urban clusters, including towns
with just a few thousand residents, may face issues similar to communities
officially designated as rural. The proportion of people living in places
designated as rural has dropped dramatically over the course of the past
hundred years; the rural population was approximately sixty percent of the
national population as of 1900, and today it is about fourteen percent.81
industry resulted in increased isolation of rural residents from “society at large,” and though “[a]n
alternative for some elderly people is to move away from their homes in rural areas to an urban area . . .
they no longer have the support of their local community network and . . . may require the support of
human services agencies to remain independent.” (quoting EILEEN S. STOMMES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
RECONNECTING RURAL AMERICA: REPORT ON RURAL INTERCITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 31
(1989)).
77.
Cf. Swenson, supra note 7 (arguing that policymakers should “seriously consider the fact that
most rural areas will not grow”).
78.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 199–200.
79.
Id.
80.
How Does the U.S. Census Bureau Define “Rural?”, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: RURAL AM., htt
ps://gis-portal.data.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7a41374f6b03456e9d138cb0
14711e01 [https://perma.cc/YF7P-9FSJ].
81.
CAROLYN DIMITRI, ANNE EFFLAND & NEILSON CONKLIN, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T
OF AGRIC., THE 20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 3 (2005),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44197/13566_eib3_1_.pdf?v=7007 [https://perma.cc/
WA2W-8ZJG].
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Nonetheless, rural communities have faced consistent tensions in the
context of their economic development, whether the community in question
existed a century ago or today. Namely, by their nature, it is more difficult
to form economies of scale in rural communities due to their low population
density and remoteness from other economic activity.82 This in turn means
that it is more difficult for rural communities to attract resources because
they offer less in exchange, whether in the form of profits or other forms of
return on investment. 83 Rural diseconomies of scale catalyze the
socioeconomic problems described above because residents have more
limited access to services that could help address that distress.84 The rural
opioid crisis, for example, is exacerbated by more limited rural access to
doctors.85 In turn, the idea that rural America is too expensive to sustain
shapes arguments that it is not worth intervening to counteract today’s rural
socioeconomic challenges.86
Commentators often refer to rural diseconomies of scale as an obstacle
to rural development or service provision, but few have sought to explore
this issue in more depth.87 “Economies of scale” literature gained traction in
the mid-twentieth century and originally focused on optimizing production
levels within private enterprises.88 Put simply, the idea is that the smaller
the level of production is for a particular good or service, the more costs per
unit the production will entail.89 Producing a higher volume, up to a point,
82.
Pruitt, Spatial Inequality, supra note 19, at 6; Pruitt & Showman, supra note 2, at 475, 501;
Deirdre Purdy, Note, An Economical, Thorough and Efficient School System and the West Virginia
School Building Authority “Economy of Scale” Numbers, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (1996);
Theodore J. Fetter, Improving Court Operations in Rural Areas, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1982).
83.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 18 (“Private services are made available
when the service provider can operate at a profit. This means that there has to be enough demand by
consumers to cover the cost of providing the service. In rural areas the private sector is less able to
provide services that are readily available in urban settings.”).
84.
Eisenberg, supra note 2 (describing the downward socioeconomic spiral that can occur when
economies of scale start to unravel due to population loss); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note
4, at 24 (“Although some urban residents do not have access to specific services, particularly if they are
provided through the market on a user pay basis, most services are generally available to urban residents
in all income classes. On the other hand, in many rural areas, especially the more remote, certain services
are not available, or are available at considerably higher cost and/or lower quality than in urban
locations.”).
85.
Amid Rural Doctor Shortage, Dozens Of Medical Workers Charged in Opioid Crackdown,
NPR (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/20/715533601/amid-rural-doctor-shortage-dozensof-medical-workers-charged-in-opioid-crackdown [https://perma.cc/W89A-RDHT].
86.
Porter, supra note 5.
87.
See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 19, at 283 n.26; Pruitt & Showman, supra note 2, at 475.
88.
Robert J. Tholkes & Charles H. Sederberg, Economies of Scale and Rural Schools, RSCH.
RURAL EDUC., Fall 1990, at 9, 10–13 (providing review of literature on economies of scale from the
1950s through 1990); see also George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & ECON. 54 (1958).
89.
Purdy, supra note 82, at 189 (summarizing economies of scale concept as idea that “a larger
factory will produce cheaper widgets,” but questioning the concept’s applicability to schools); Fetter,
supra note 82, at 256–57 (arguing that goal of achieving rural economies of scale relates to goal of
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means a more efficient use of resources.90 Thus, businesses “must operate
at the optimum size” in order to “obtain maximum economies of scale.”91
A simple example of this might be the labor and expenses a baker would
put into making a single cookie—still having to buy and measure all of the
ingredients in bulk, mix them, shape the cookie, and bake the cookie—
versus making an entire batch of cookies with only the slightly heightened
proportionate amount of labor, mostly directed to shaping additional
cookies.
A “diseconomy of scale,” by contrast, exists when the average cost of
production increases with increased output. 92 Rural population scarcity
builds additional costs into the provision of virtually any product or service
because of the costs associated with distance, such as needing to traverse
the distance and increased uncertainty associated with that distance.93 On
the other side of that coin, because rural populations are more limited, there
are fewer consumers to offset those higher costs, meaning rural
diseconomies of scale will be more likely in most types of economic
activity.94 Drawing upon the cookie example, it would be as if the baker
making the cookies had thirty customers for dozens of cookies within one
mile, but then had to drive a small amount of cookies ten miles away for
two customers; those latter customers do not necessarily seem worth the
additional costs due to their diseconomies of scale for the cookies.
Thus, in the private sector, most companies would prefer to direct their
services to urban centers because they can offer their products at a higher
volume with lower relative costs.95 Of course, urban communities, simply
by having more people, also offer more demand for products. So, for
example, a private internet service provider would want to establish itself to
serve an urban community not just because the urban community would
offer more consumers, but also because the provider would make a more

achieving efficient use of resources, and often favors consolidation of resources); Donald J. Boudreaux
& Roger Meiners, Externality: Origins and Classifications, 59 NAT. RES. J. 1, 4 (2019); Bradley T.
Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 722–23 (2009) (describing the
“cost-reducing potential of economies of scale” as “the decline in average cost per-unit as output rises”).
90.
Borden, supra note 89, at 724–25 (noting that production at too high a level produces
diseconomies of scale).
91.
Id. at 723.
92.
Id. at 724.
93.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 25–26 (discussing higher costs per capita in
smaller communities and increased costs associated with service provision to remote localities).
94.
See id. at 3 (noting “delivering any particular service” is “more expensive in a rural location
than in urban centres” because of lower population density, larger distances to travel, and smaller
numbers of people that preclude economies of scale).
95.
Cf. Borden, supra note 89, at 722–23 (noting businesses’ motivations to create economies of
scale due to their cost-reducing potential from decline in average cost per-unit as output rises).
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efficient use of its own resources in yielding higher returns per capita.96
Once a provider achieves a level of production and consumption that can be
sustained, that threshold is considered to be “at scale.” When it comes to
industries with high fixed costs, such as the installation of permanent
infrastructure fixtures, the prospect of rural investments seems all the less
appealing.97
The aspiration to achieve economies of scale also arises in the context of
public and quasi-public amenities, such as schools and hospitals. 98
Although schools and hospitals do not produce the goods initially
contemplated by this theory, they do have outputs and operating costs.99 The
idea here, too, is that more output will tend to make for more efficient use
of costs. Thus, a rural school or hospital that serves three people would
likely be considered not “at scale.”100 The principle of the economy of scale
favors consolidation, at least to an extent.101
When the question of “economies of scale” is applied to rural
communities as a whole, their very existence—and the question of whether
the broader community should support them—seems called into question.102
Those who emphasize the primacy of economies of scale tend to suggest
that declining rural communities are not self-sustaining enough to justify
the public expenditures that they need to function. 103 A particular
municipality’s entire economic activity—local wages earned, property
96.
Cf. Sharon Strover, Reaching Rural America with Broadband Internet Service, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:08 PM), https://theconversation.com/reaching-rural-america-with-br
oadband-internet-service-82488 [https://perma.cc/6P4D-FU79] (noting role of population sparseness
and fewer customers from whom to recoup costs as reasons rural residents have limited access to quality
internet service); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3 (noting higher costs of service
provision in rural areas).
97.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 33 (describing increase in minimum efficient
scale in service provision due to technological change, as well as high fixed costs associated with
technologies, both of which conflict with shrinking rural demand and minimal cost savings in rural
communities); Borden, supra note 89, at 750 (describing small-scale output as a “typical barrier to entry”
in a new market).
98.
See Tholkes & Sederberg, supra note 88; Monica Giancotti, Annamaria Guglielmo &
Marianna Mauro, Efficiency and Optimal Size of Hospitals: Results of a Systematic Search, PLOS ONE,
Mar. 29, 2017, at 1, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5371367/ [https://perma.cc/6JVM73N7]; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 16, 20–21 (suggesting that services can
be grouped into three types: private, public (e.g., police protection, firefighting services, building
inspection, or waste disposal), and collective/joint).
99.
See Tholkes & Sederberg, supra note 88, at 10–11.
100. See, e.g., H.R. 1109, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2004) (Arkansas law
mandating school district consolidation or annexation when attendance drops below 350 students).
101. See Borden, supra note 89, at 723–24.
102. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, 3 (observing that the high costs of rural
service provision need to be weighed against the interests of society as a whole).
103. See Matthew Yglesias, The Inefficiency of Rural Living, SLATE (June 6, 2012, 10:13 AM), h
ttps://slate.com/business/2012/06/the-inefficiency-of-rural-living.html [https://perma.cc/4DSF-8RDK]
(pointing out the inefficiency in providing services like broadband internet, brick-and-mortar mail, and
medical services to rural communities).
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taxes collected, and developers attracted, for example—may still be lower
than the local and external public inputs that would be needed to meet
residents’ needs. Those inputs would also need to be disproportionately high
on a per resident basis than they would for urban communities.
This tension raises the question of whether higher rural costs per capita
mean that rural communities’ existence cannot be justified, to the extent that
their survival depends on disproportionately high public support and
intervention. 104 Such diseconomies of scale are a constant concern
underlying the question of whether and how public services should be
provided to rural communities.105 Rural communities are seen as a relatively
inefficient use of resources; city-dwellers may resent the idea of having to
“subsidize” rural life. 106 Diseconomies of scale also explain private
enterprises’ reluctance to locate in rural communities due to the more
limited returns on their investments.
Proposals to pursue revitalization policies for rural communities need to
account for the ever-present question of supposed rural inefficiency when
measured on the basis of costs per capita. In later sections, this Article
moves the discussion beyond what are ultimately relatively narrow
questions of costs and return on investment. A community’s worth and
contributions to society, it is argued, cannot necessarily be summed up on
an accounting sheet, a perspective that past regulatory policy seemed to
embrace more readily.
II. RURAL AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH REGULATION
This Part provides a limited legal history of rural America and its
relationship with economic regulation. Section II.A discusses late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal regimes that sought to protect
rural communities and nurture their economic growth by regulating
common carriers and public utilities. Section II.B moves to the mid- to latecentury era of deregulation and its often-fatal effects for rural communities.
Section II.C argues that the phenomena highlighted in II.B are an
underappreciated part of the story of rural decline, and that the infrastructure
industries’ abandonment of rural communities during the deregulatory era
should be recognized as a series of market failures that warrant correction.
104. See Schleicher, supra note 7, at 143–45.
105. See Bassett, supra note 19, at 283 n.26.
106. Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 31 (noting reduced willingness of
national governments to subsidize rural service provision); Scott Wallsten, Rural Broadband Subsidy
Programs Are a Failure. We Need to Fix Them., THE HILL (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://thehill.com/b
logs/pundits-blog/technology/323200-rural-broadband-subsidy-programs-are-a-failure-we-need-to-fix
[https://perma.cc/KJ5G-LUGF] (arguing that rural broadband subsidy programs have been wasteful and
unfairly financed by all taxpayers, including low-income urban residents).
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A. The Old Regime, 1870s-1970s: Ensuring Rural Access to Services
In the century prior to about 1970, federal economic regulatory policy
embraced the idea that rural communities needed unique forms of protection
if they were going to be able to survive. Indeed, there was more recognition
generally that public intervention is a necessary precursor to private
growth.107 The 1887 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which introduced new
regulations overseeing the railroad industry, reflected Congress’s first
significant intervention to control a major economic sector.108 The ICA laid
the groundwork for the next several decades of economic regulation of
infrastructure industries by introducing the mandate for service providers
not to discriminate among localities, to charge “reasonable and just rates,”
and to publish tariffs in the interest of transparency.109
The ICA’s provisions “appl[ied] to any common carrier or carriers
engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad,
or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a
common control, management, or arrangement,” in interstate or
international travel.110 A common carrier was understood to be engaged in
transportation of products or passengers for the benefit of the public, as
opposed to those who typically engaged in ad hoc contractual
arrangements. 111 The ICA also created the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) in order to implement and oversee the new regulatory
regime.112
In the 1886 debates over the ICA, legislators consistently returned to the
vulnerability of small and remote towns, as well as the “interior” of the
country, to high rates and exploitation by unscrupulous railroad operators
seeking to maximize their profits.113 Common concerns included the risks
107. See Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 447–49.
108. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379. The Supreme Court laid
the foundation for Congress to pursue such a move a decade earlier with its decision in Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876), which established that state governments could regulate private businesses that
affect public interests.
109. Interstate Commerce Act §§ 1, 2, 6.
110. § 1.
111. Munn, 94 U.S. at 121–32 (“[C]ommon carriers . . . are held to ‘exercise a sort of public
office,’ and have public duties to perform. . . . [They stand] in the very ‘gateway of commerce,’ and take
toll from all who pass.”); Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers,
71 YALE L.J. 307, 307 (1961) (“A common carrier may be defined as one who holds himself out as
willing to carry any or specified commodities for all who may choose to employ him; upon making this
offer he becomes legally obligated to serve all shippers at reasonable rates and without discrimination.
A contract carrier, on the other hand, is one who does not hold himself out to serve the public; he incurs
no special legal obligations.”).
112. Interstate Commerce Act § 11.
113. Congress’s attention was brought to this topic by “a pre-Populist agrarian political
movement” of farmers who “object[ed] to the excessively high rates being charged them by the
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of the countryside depopulating, businesses having to close, and allowing
or facilitating the concentrated growth of a few commercial centers if the
railroads’ ability to discriminate among localities remained unchecked.114
For instance, Senator Camden of West Virginia commented that
manufacturers and shippers in parts of the country with disadvantaged
access to transportation “may be either forced into bankruptcy or compelled
to remove their business to the cities or competitive railroad centers.”115 He
observed that this would have “the effect of driving population and business
enterprise from the country and the towns to the cities and centers of railroad
competition, and of creating for one section over another section
commercial advantages which no power ought to be permitted to
exercise.”116
Senator Miller of New York expressed a similar concern about
commercial disadvantages to remote places and problems associated with
compelling residents and businesses to move to cities. He proposed that
“diversified industries should be spread all over the country and not brought
together in a few great centers.”117 Miller argued that inequitable rail rates,
by coercing relocation to urban centers for access to cheap transportation,
were “making a few great centers rich—rich not out of newly created
wealth, but rich simply because you transfer wealth from other portions of
our country to those great centers.”118 Miller referred to “[t]he abnormal
monopoly railroads for grain movements to eastern markets.” Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23,
at 448.
114. See 17 CONG. REC. 3,872 (1886) (Senator Sherman of Ohio argued, “One of the great evils
of our times in commercial transactions is the vast concentration of capital and labor in great commercial
centers. What has built up Chicago? It is simply because Chicago has enormous advantages over every
interior town.”); 17 CONG. REC. 4,186–87 (1886) (Senator Camden, criticizing draft language limiting
the non-discrimination principle, said, “In my judgment there can be no reason given for it except the
reason to legislate in favor of the cities and the large competitive shipping points, to build them up and
to depopulate the towns and the distribution of manufactories throughout the country. . . . I want to see
cities grow, but they ought not to grow at the expense of the country at large.”); 18 CONG. REC. 857
(1887) (Congressman Henderson argued, “Their coming builds up towns and enriches communities; so,
too, their unjust management has often destroyed cities and towns and torn down hard-earned fortunes.
Railroad owners must learn the new lesson that is coming to us all in this country, and that is to be
content with a reasonable profit on investments, and that labor, small capital, and small shippers have
their rights just as well as stock-owners and powerful shippers.”); 17 CONG. REC. 7,281 (1886)
(Congressman Reagan argued that allowing service providers to discriminate “enables the transportation
companies to control the manufacturing interests of the country and to drive them from non-competitive
points and from the rural parts of the country, where living is cheaper and health better, to the great
commercial centers . . . This is a power which no government of a free people would dare to exercise,
and which no wisely administered government would think of exercising, and yet the railroad companies
demand and insist on the right to exercise this vast and dangerous power. And under it they are
impoverishing some cities, towns, and communities, without any fault of theirs, and enriching others
having no other merit to this favor than the arbitrary power of the transportation companies.”).
115. 17 CONG. REC. 3,553 (1886).
116. Id.
117. 17 CONG. REC. 3,727 (1886).
118. Id.
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growth of our great cities,” attributing it “almost entirely to the
discriminations of railroad companies.” 119 He argued that, but for this
discrimination, “instead of a few great and overgrown centers where wealth
is accumulated enormously . . . there would now be scattered all over this
broad country in every little village and hamlet the great industries which
collect around a few great competing points.”120
Legislators were not merely concerned with fairness to small and remote
places and their residents, but also with the public benefits of having
widespread, equitable access to affordable transportation, at least for
shipping purposes.121 Senator Cullom of Illinois remarked upon the benefits
to consumers, arguing, “[e]very portion of this country . . . is alike interested
in having the products of different sections of the country moved long
distances at cheap rates, which benefit the people who require these
products as well as the people who raise them.”122 He emphasized further
that it was in “the interest of the whole country” that domestic products find
a market somewhere, making this “not simply a question of whether Tom
Jones can get his corn to market in Springfield,” but rather, “what the
general policy shall be in order to encourage commerce all over this
land.”123
Like today, the prospect of protecting remote and sparsely populated
places had detractors. For instance, New York Senator Platt criticized the
possibility of all localities along railroad branches receiving comparable
rates regardless of distance traveled. Raising concerns mirroring the
efficiency considerations outlined above, he questioned the wisdom of
charging the same rates for near and remote places “without reference to the
cost of construction or the amount of business which is to be upon those
branches” for branches that ran “through a sparsely populated country . . .
and where there is very little business and over a road which it has cost no

119. Id.
120. Id. In a perhaps less sympathetic line of reasoning, some legislators reflected the view that
urban communities generally were sites of moral decay and that rural communities should be sustained
because the residents were more moral or industrious. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 4,404 (1886) (Senator
Sherman arguing that railroad discrimination “destroys the smaller towns or communities, where vice
does not prevail so largely as in great cities . . . where public opinion to a certain extent controls vice
and controls all the habits of mankind. Corruption breeds in cities.”); 17 CONG. REC. 3,877 (1886)
(“There are a great many people in the cities. They sow not, neither do they spin.”).
121. Indeed, the entire reason railroads were able to expand involved “the economic incentives of
generous federal and state land grants, loans, bonds, purchases of stock, and remission of taxes” based
on the recognition “that the economic development of the interior of the North American continent
required that a transportation infrastructure be built.” Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 448.
122. 17 CONG. REC. 3,867 (1886).
123. Id. at 3,867–68; see also id. at 3,876 (Senator Miller arguing that “[i]f the West can not find
a market for its vast surplus, then New England, New York, and Pennsylvania will have no market for
their manufactured products.”).
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less to build.”124 Much commentary seemed to agree that an overly strict
rule could cause harm, and exceptions were built into the legislation based
upon potential hardships to railroad operators.125 The bill passed the Senate
with 47 votes in favor, four votes against, and 25 absences on May 12, 1886,
and it passed the House with 219 votes in favor, 41 votes against, and 58
absences on January 21, 1887.126
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the post-ICA railroad system
was perfect; the evolution of the industry was always plagued by
controversy, exploitative practices, and financial complexities.127 The ICC
was also not necessarily the most potent administrator, at least initially.128
Nonetheless, the ICA’s intervention was largely effective in enabling small,
remote, and rural places to access rail lines. In 1917, the national core rail
network for freight and passenger service had 254,000 miles, compared to
140,000 today.129 A passenger during that era could travel from Maine to
Florida without changing trains. 130 By 1929, “[a]lmost every town and
village in the nation enjoyed rail passenger service.”131
Rural access to the rail lines in turn yielded the positive, or at least
insulating, effects for economic development in remote communities that
the ICA’s drafters anticipated. In the early twentieth century, “thanks to the
railroads, corporations now saw the whole country as a unified market,
encouraging businesses to expand beyond the borders of a particular state
or region. America was now a national economy, rather than a series of
124. 17 CONG. REC. 3,834 (1886).
125. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 3,870 (1886) (Senator Gorman of Maryland stating, “every railroad
expert, I think, who appeared before the committee . . . admit [sic] that a rule which prohibits a railroad
company from charging more for hauling a car-load 300 miles than is charged for hauling a car-load
1,000 miles over the same road and in the same direction is just and proper; but they all contend that
there are innumerable instances constantly occurring where exceptions must be made, or great injustice
would result. Therefore, the rule should not be a rigid one[.]”).
126. 17 CONG. REC. 4,423 (1886); 18 CONG. REC. 881 (1887).
127. See CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, THE GREAT RAILROAD REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF TRAINS IN
AMERICA 325–26 (2012) (discussing Southern courts’ role in convicting large groups of freed Black
people through the early 1900s so that their cheap prison labor could be used for railroad construction);
id. at 207 (discussing widespread rail company bankruptcies during 1890s due to economic downturn);
ORSI, supra note 45, at 298 (discussing controversy over rate regulation in early 1900s).
128. See WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 308–19 (describing railway displacement of Native
Americans, corruption among rail executives, and rampant railway company consolidation despite the
advent of the ICC, as well as the ICC’s ineffectuality until 1906).
129. See id. at 308–09; AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 71
(2017).
130. WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 308–09.
131. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 450; see also Jonathan English, Why Did America
Give Up on Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.), BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:38 AM), ht
tps://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-31/why-is-american-mass-transit-so-bad-it-s-a-long
-story [https://perma.cc/AEH2-XB7U] (observing at the turn of the last century, “[h]uge networks of
‘interurbans’—a kind of streetcar that ran deep into rural areas—spread out from cities across the
country”).
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regional ones[.]”132 As an example, historian Richard Orsi argues that the
Southern Pacific Railroad played an integral, even intentional role, in
Western “regional economic development, small-farm settlement,
agricultural change, and environmental policy.” 133 These relationships
make sense, ultimately; a functioning, affordable transportation sector is a
necessary precursor to economic growth, just as the absence of
transportation will necessarily stifle commerce.134
Congress amended the ICA with the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (MCA)
to bring trucks and buses under the ICC’s purview alongside railroads, in
significant part due to the railroads’ insistence that it was unfair for them to
be the sole transportation industry impeded by strict regulation.135 Similar
strains in public sentiment also drove the MCA’s passage: competition
among truckers during the Great Depression had reached extreme levels,
and “[s]ome feared that continuation of such unrestrained market forces
might lead to a loss of service or higher prices for small shippers and
communities, leaving the surviving carriers to concentrate on high-revenue
traffic.”136
Rural priorities seemed more mixed during debates over the MCA as
compared to the ICA.137 During the 1934 debates over the bill in the House
of Representatives, one congressman submitted telegrams from constituents
pointing out that rural communities who still lacked rail access depended
disproportionately on the trucking industry. Federal regulation of trucks,
they argued, would increase the costs associated with trucking and have an
adverse impact on small and independent carriers.138 A representative of the
132. WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 309–10.
133. ORSI, supra note 45, at xvii.
134. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 463 (“Trade routes are the arteries of the
economic system, linking every city, town, and hamlet to the life blood of commerce. ‘Transportation
and economic development are mutually interdependent—transportation improvements stimulate
economic growth, and that growth, in turn, increases the demand for transportation.’ The converse is
also true.” (quoting Abdussalam A. Addus, Subsidizing Air Service to Small Communities, 39 TRANSP.
Q. 537, 552 (1985))); see also Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 237–38 (“As the gateways to
an increasingly global market, transportation corridors are the arteries through which everyone, and
everything everyone consumes, flow. . . . As a fundamental component of the infrastructure upon which
economic growth is built . . . a healthy transportation system serving the public’s needs for ubiquitous
service at reasonable prices is vitally important to the region and the nation it serves. . . . [A] community
with poor, declining or deteriorating access to the established and prevailing transportation networks
will wither like a human limb or organ starved of oxygen by an artery made impassable by a tenacious
blood clot.”).
135. Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers, supra note 111,
at 308–09.
136. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The
Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 344 (1983).
137. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.
138. Representative Paul H. Maloney introduced telegrams opposing the bill, arguing in identical
language, “Should trucks be under the Interstate Commerce Commission transportation costs will be
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Eastern Apple Growers’ Council testified before the House of
Representatives:
[W]ith the passage of this bill and the ultimate carrying out of all of
the provisions . . . you are going to eliminate the small independent
truck owner and turn the truck transportation over to large
transportation companies . . .
You take, for instance, now we have common carrier lines running
out of the smaller cities in Virginia and all over the country,
supplying storekeepers and merchants throughout the country that
have no railroad facilities. Those trucks run regularly, on regular
routes, and haul the goods out and the produce out under intrastate
regulations.
Now, if you put them under Federal regulation it will finally raise
the cost of transportation. . . . You are going to affect the price level
of the purchases and the sales of every farmer in every rural
community in the entire United States.
....
. . . I am a champion of the small and independent carrier, because
he is the salvation of the rural section, so far as transportation costs
are concerned. If we can keep him independent and unregulated, our
transportation costs will be kept down.139
On the other hand, a representative of the Oneonta Chamber of
Commerce and other Upstate New York organizations argued in favor of
increased regulation. His region’s economic activity largely depended on
rail, and he argued that “communities where railroads and railroad
employees are important factors . . . are all interested in overcoming the
handicaps put on railroad transportation by unregulated carriers by water
and motor trucks.” 140 He insisted that this was a “vital” question for
“agricultural sections of the country.” 141 Similarly, a representative for
southern grain shippers argued that “our business is in jeopardy on account
of unregulated” transportation, and that the ICA was a success “because we
do not have to worry about giving a big dinner party, or having a poker

increased, which will affect adversely rural communities which are dependent on trucking facilities.”
Regulation of Interstate Motor Busses and Trucks on Public Highways: Hearing on H.R. 6836 Before
the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 73d Cong. 453 (1934).
139. Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers: Hearing on H.R. 5262 and H.R. 6016 Before a
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 74th Cong. 299 (1935) (statement of W.S.
Campfield).
140. The Water Carrier Act, 1935: Hearing on H.R. 5379 Before H. Comm. on Merch. Marine &
Fisheries, 74th Cong. 156–57 (1935) (statement of William Capron).
141. Id. at 158.
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party, or something of that sort, in order to get a rate” in rail
transportation.142
The MCA ultimately seemed to attempt to reconcile competing rural
interests. It provided that common carriers by motor vehicle needed to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC in
order to operate, and that such providers could not engage in unjust
discrimination among localities. 143 But it automatically grandfathered in
carriers operating before June 1, 1935. 144 The Act also excluded “motor
vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and used in the
transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof, or in
the transportation of supplies to his farm” and “motor vehicles used
exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural
commodities[.]”145
According to Paul Stephen Dempsey, the MCA, like the ICA, succeeded
in providing equitable rural access to these transportation services. After the
MCA’s passage:
Destructive competition abated, and during the half century which
followed, motor carrier service was ubiquitously available
throughout the nation at a price which was “just and reasonable.”
Service was safe and dependable to large and small communities
throughout the nation. . . . [T]here was some measure of “cross
subsidization” performed under the regulatory umbrella of the ICC .
. . with more lucrative, denser traffic lanes paying a premium above
marginal costs to subsidize rural and small community service.146
Congress continued its pattern of intervention with the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 (CAA). 147 In advocating the legislation’s passage, aviator
Colonel Edgar Gorrell, one of the law’s most ardent advocates, argued in
testimony before Congress that smaller airlines required protection against
stronger, larger lines.148 He contended that by “reaching out into the regions
of light-density traffic and developing smaller communities, the small lines
142. To Amend the Interstate Commerce Act: Hearing on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 1635 Before
the S. Comm. on Interstate Com. and the Merch. Marine Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Com., 74th Cong.
714–15 (1935) (statement of Harry A. Volz).
143. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, §§ 206(a), 216(d), 49 Stat. 543, 551, 558.
144. Motor Carrier Act § 206(a).
145. Motor Carrier Act § 203(a)(21)(b).
146. Dempsey, supra note 76, at 187.
147. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§
401–722).
148. Aviation: Hearing on H.R.5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Com., 75th Cong. 90 (1937) [hereinafter Aviation Hearing]; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise
and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91
(1979).
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have performed an incalculable service to the country.” 149 To keep
providing that service, they needed assurance through “an opportunity to
protect themselves against even the possibility of oppressive
competition.”150 The CAA was passed, and “entry regulation was imposed
upon the infant airline industry, in part, so that small communities would
have access to this emerging mode of transport.”151
Congress once again continued on the path of intervention with the
Transportation Act of 1940.152 This was the first federal effort to craft a
comprehensive national transportation policy, 153 and the first time “a
national transportation policy governing all agencies subject to the Interstate
Commerce act [sic] ha[d] been enacted.”154 Its “chief feature” was “further
extension of unified and centralized control of domestic transportation,”
including adding water carriers to the ICC’s purview, setting additional
rates and permit requirements, and establishing a Board of Investigation and
Research to study each mode of transportation.155 Overall, transportation
policies culminating with the 1940 act “reflect[ed] a strong congressional
policy that the public in rural areas be protected against pricing and service
discrimination.”156
As with transportation, regulatory policy of the era embraced the idea
that geographically equitable access to telecommunications services was
necessary. After the advent of the telephone in 1876, Alexander Graham
Bell’s use of his patented technology helped him establish the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in 1895, which initially had a
monopoly. 157 With the expiration of the patents just after 1900, AT&T
encountered competition from independent companies.158 Theodore Vail,
then-president of AT&T, “pressed for universal service and government
regulation to curb what he saw as wasteful competition.”159 AT&T was then
brought under the jurisdiction of the ICC with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,
which amended the ICA.160 The Act applied “to telegraph, telephone, and
149. Aviation Hearing, supra note 148, at 90.
150. Id.
151. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 449; see also Dempsey, supra note 148, at 92–
95 (discussing Congress’s creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board and subsequent dismantling of it).
152. Transportation Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-785, 54 Stat. 898.
153. Robert W. Harbeson, The Transportation Act of 1940, 17 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 291,
291 (1941).
154. Ralph L. Dewey, The Transportation Act of 1940, 31 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 15 (1941).
155. Id. at 16, 23.
156. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 449.
157. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell With His Invisible Hands: Divestiture,
Deregulation, and the Need for a New Telecommunications Policy, 11 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT.
L.J. 527, 531–32 (1989).
158. Id. at 532.
159. Id.
160. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, sec. 7, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 544–47 (1910).
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cable companies (whether wired or wireless) engaged in sending messages
from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, to any other . . .
who shall be considered and held to be common carriers.”161 It excluded
from the Act “the transmission of messages by telephone, telegraph, or
cable wholly within one State.”162 It provided that all charges made for “the
transmission of messages by telegraph, telephone, or cable . . . shall be just
and reasonable”163 and that rates and charges for telegraph and telephone
transmissions could not be “unjust or unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory.”164
The Radio Acts of 1912 and 1927 also held major implications for rural
access to telecommunications. The former placed radio communications
under the jurisdiction of the ICC.165 The latter created the Federal Radio
Commission and established the standard that radio stations, in order to
receive a license, needed to show that the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity would be served by the granting” of the license.166 In advocating
passage of the Radio Act of 1927, Congressman Johnson of Texas
commented that his rural constituents had requested that Congress intervene
with anti-monopoly, anti-discrimination measures:
The people of Texas are interested in legislation on this subject. .
. . I want to quote from [a letter] which I received . . . from a farmer
who lives in an inland rural community in my home country. . . .
[T]he writer says:
[“]Please use your influence in keeping corporations from getting
control of the air by a series of chain stations, high-power stations,
purchase of wave lengths, or any other monopoly that would create
further disturbances which will interfere with our listening in on other
closer-in stations. The combination of the eight large stations in the
northeast[] . . . are very annoying to people in Texas.[”]167
Congress subsequently enacted the Communications Act of 1934 and
modeled it after the ICA.168 As with the Transportation Act of the same
period, rural interests were mixed, with some advocating protections and
universal service and others arguing that small, independent rural service

161. Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 157, at 532.
162. Mann-Elkins Act sec. 7, § 1.
163. Id.
164. Mann-Elkins Act § 15.
165. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302.
166. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167.
167. 67 CONG. REC. 5,558 (1926).
168. See Dempsey, supra note 157, at 530, 533; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Turning Points in
Telecommunications History, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 513, 530 (2012).
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providers and their constituents would be better off left alone.169 Many rural
communities were served by small, independent phone companies with just
a few dozen to a few hundred customers.170 Their representatives insisted
that complying with additional federal regulations would impose costs on
companies that were already struggling to survive and serve their
constituents.171 On the other hand, some remained concerned about rural
access to quality radio communications, particularly since rural
communities were disproportionately dependent on radio. 172 Texas
Congressman Thomas Blanton, in advocating for protecting rural access to
radio communications, argued, “every congressional district of the United
States is entitled to a small local station, and I want to see every
Congressman here have at least a small local station in his home town. The
people are entitled to this.”173
The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and tasked it with ensuring “so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges.”174 Like the MCA, it seemed to try to reconcile competing rural
interests. The Act specifically excluded from its purview any intrastate
communications or any wire communications already regulated by a state
commission. 175 This would have excluded small, independent, locally
focused telephone companies. But the Act’s mandate for universal service
was broad, meaning that those rural communities without service would be
able to receive it under the Act, which provided:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate
or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such
169. See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 3,687–88, 3,692, 3,702 (1932) (discussing importance of small,
independent radio stations).
170. See Federal Communications Commission: Hearing on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm. on
Interstate Com., 73d Cong. 184 (1934) (mentioning existence of thousands of “little telephone
companies, cooperative lines, and farmer lines” which would be challenged to comply with new federal
requirements).
171. E.g., Federal Communications Commission: Hearing on H.R. 8301 Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Com., 73d Cong. 273 (1934).
172. See 75 CONG. REC. 3,698–99 (1932). One reason for the act involved opposition to the
Federal Radio Commission. Congressman Sirovich characterized it as “autocratic and tyrannical,” and
claimed that they had “ridden ruthlessly over the small stations of the country.” Id. at 3,699. He proposed
“to stop their nefarious conduct” by abolishing the Commission and transferring their work to the
Department of Commerce. Id.
173. Id. at 3698.
174. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151); see also Larkin, supra note 168, at 530. Electrification was also a concern.
In the early 1930s, ninety percent of city dwellers had access to reliable electricity, while only ten percent
of rural residents did. To bridge this gap, the Roosevelt administration pushed the Rural Electrification
Act (REA) of 1936 through Congress. Jeter, Thomas & Wells, supra note 37, at 365.
175. Communications Act §§ 2(b), 3(e).
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communication service upon reasonable request therefor; and, in
accordance with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action
necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical
connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and
charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to
establish and provide facilities and regulations for operating such
through routes.176
The Act required that charges for services be “just and reasonable” and
prohibited common carriers from making “any unjust or unreasonable
discrimination.” 177 Its goal of achieving universal service meant that
“subscribers in rural, isolated and high-cost areas . . . should have access to
services at comparable rates to those available in urban areas.”178
The tensions surrounding telecommunications service provision, access,
and pricing mirrored those surrounding transportation. 179 In the 1950s,
telephone companies requested rate increases, but were denied by the Public
Utility Commissions that oversaw them in part due to the public policy
objective of universal service. 180 Instead of increasing rates, agencies
developed a policy of subsidizing local rates by making long-distance rates
more expensive, thereby making local rates more affordable for average
users.181 This meant that “the generous profits earned on heavily trafficked,
densely populated (urban) routes subsidized less profitable, thin (rural)
markets.”182 This substantial revenue-shifting system persisted for several
176. Communications Act § 201(a).
177. Communications Act §§ 201(b), 202(a).
178. Nadine Irène Kozak, On the Last Mile: The Effects of Telecommunications Regulation and
Deregulation in the Rural Western United States and Canada 18 (2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California San Diego) (on file with the University of California eScholarship).
179. FCC Commissioner Craven gave a particularly passionate argument in favor of increased
protections for rural access to radio in a 1942 House hearing to consider amendments in the
Communications Act of 1934: “the proposed bill suggests correctly that the distribution of radio
broadcasting facilities remains a problem. . . . [I]t is unthinkable that any section of the Nation’s
population should be deprived of radio service or that we should willingly permit a degradation of
existing service to any area. . . . [T]he forcing of unsound competition in the field of radio will nullify
the directions of Congress to distribute radio broadcasting facilities fairly and equitably among the
various States and communities. Moreover, the forced application of the doctrine of unlimited economic
competition will result in a further concentration of competitive stations in the large cities and a dearth
of facilities in the smaller communities throughout the Nation. Likewise, if too many stations are forced
into the large cities, the net result will be impaired program service to the entire Nation. . . . with the
consequence that rural radio listeners may be sacrificed for a regulatory theory in which the commercial
aspects of radio broadcasting are overemphasized and the public service aspects are neglected. . . . The
population residing in rural areas is entitled to receive as much improved radio service as people in cities.
There should be no discrimination.” Proposed Changes in the Communications Act of 1934: Hearing
on H.R. 5497 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 77th Cong. 981–83 (1942).
180. Dempsey, supra note 157, at 534.
181. Id. at 535.
182. Id.
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decades. As late as 1983, “the average monthly price charged for local
residential service was about $11, while the average monthly cost of
providing the service was approximately $26.”183
Although perhaps less profitable for the service providers, these
approaches were effective. Telephone access went from forty percent of
U.S. households in 1930 to more than ninety percent in 1970. 184 Rural
access to radio, alongside rural electrification pursued in the same era, is
credited with modernizing the American countryside. Like transportation,
affordable access to telecommunications is an essential part of economic
vitality. 185 Specifically, “the availability of telecommunication services
reduces isolation, increases business viability, improves farming
productivity, and improves access to educational and medical services.”186
The availability of quality telecommunications infrastructure can help rural
communities attract other resources and thrive, while on the flip side, the
absence of effective telecommunications may doom a region to economic
stagnation.187
In general, the regulatory approach for public utilities in this era sought
to reduce competition for several reasons. Certain service providers were
deemed to have natural monopolies, or markets where high costs of entry
would result in “economic waste” if competition were allowed by making
customers pay multiple times for fixed costs of infrastructure, such as
stringing telephone wires. 188 Thus, policymakers actively advocated
barriers to entry and unification of services in order to allow the service
provider in question to achieve an economy of scale.189 But the question of
rural access also revealed that competition needed to be curtailed for another
reason: if small, independent rural service providers—like telephone
companies, radio stations, and truck companies—were forced to compete
with large corporate companies, the rural service providers were going to
lose, which would likely also mean a drop in quality of service to rural
communities. Further, if competition remained unfettered, more rural
communities risked not being served at all.
From the passage of the ICA through the 1940s, the regulatory
frameworks that governed the transportation and telecommunications
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 535–36; US Household Penetration of Telecommunications, 1920-2015, in JEAN-PAUL
RODRIGUE, THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS (5th ed. 2020), https://transportgeography.org/?
page_id=1706 [https://perma.cc/C5YY-QASX].
185. See Peter L. Stenberg, Sania Rahman, M. Bree Perrin & Erica Johnson, Rural Areas in the
New Telecommunications Era, 12 RURAL DEV. PERSPS., no. 3, 1997, at 32; Craig, supra note 45, at 2.
186. Stenberg, Rahman, Perrin & Johnson, supra note 185, at 32.
187. Cf. UTAH COAL COUNTRY STRIKE FORCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5, 7 (2019) (identifying
high-quality regional broadband as economic asset that can be used to pursue large-scale revitalization).
188. Dempsey, supra note 157, at 536.
189. Id. at 536–37.
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industries served the goal of securing, enhancing, or protecting rural service
in four main ways. First, those frameworks removed barriers to rural access
to services by forcing companies to be responsive to rural service requests
through principles of non-discrimination.190 Second, they protected existing
rural services by excluding or protecting small, independent intrastate
service providers from regulation, and by protecting existing providers from
competition so they could achieve economies of scale.191 Third, they limited
service providers’ ability to abandon rural service by requiring
administrative justifications to do so and refusing requests if those
justifications did not comport with public interest standards.192 And fourth,
they helped make rural services affordable through measures such as
subsidizing rural rates with profits from less-expensive regions and by
imposing the “just and reasonable” standard for rates.193
Altogether, these protections created a framework that had a substantial
impact in helping rural communities overcome the handicap of the
diseconomies of scale that naturally arise with distance and population
sparseness. As Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks, andChristopher Serkin
observe, this regulatory order “promoted geographic dispersion in economic
activity . . . [and] helped construct an era of geographic convergence in the
mid-twentieth century.” 194 While regional wealth today tends to be
concentrated in a handful of megacities, during this regulatory period, more
190. The ICA, the MCA, the Telecommunications Act, and other major statutes included explicit
mandates to this effect. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 104, 110 Stat. 56, 86;
Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 543, 543; Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, § 2, 24 Stat. 379, 379–80.
191. For example, small, local phone lines were excluded from telephone regulations; small,
independent radio stations were given special treatment; and small, independent truckers were excluded
from trucking regulations in order not to burden rural communities. See Communications Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply or to
give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . intrastate communication service of any carrier”);
Communications Act § 221(b) (excepting from Act any services or facilities “where such matters are
subject to regulation by a State commission or by local governmental authority”); Communications Act
§ 307(b) (allowing Federal Communications Commission to issue special radio licenses for stations not
exceeding 100 watts of power if deemed necessary); Motor Carrier Act § 203(a)(21)(b) (excluding
various kinds of motor vehicles from statute’s purview, including those controlled and operated by
farmers to transport products to and from their farms, those used exclusively to carry livestock, fish, or
agricultural commodities, and “casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or
property”). Otherwise, natural monopolies, like phone service provision, were protected from
competition by utility regulations. Communications Act § 214(a) (“No carrier shall undertake the
construction of a new line or of an extension of any line . . . unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity
require or will require . . . such additional or extended line”); see also id. (excluding from provision any
“local, branch, or terminal lines not exceeding ten miles in length”).
192. Many service providers, like railroad and airline services, sought to abandon service to rural
communities over the years, but their requests were denied by state and federal agencies based on the
likely effects to rural communities. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 450–55.
193. Communications Act §§ 201(b), 202(a); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 1346–47.
194. Sitaraman, Ricks & Serkin, supra note 41 (manuscript at 2–3).
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wealth moved across geographic boundaries. This distributional geographic
equity was in large part due to the role of the regulatory apparatus in evening
the playing field for disadvantaged localities that would otherwise be what
they are seen as today—“left behind.”195
Of course, regulated industries mandated to provide non-discriminatory
access and fair rates to rural communities did not create rural utopias. Rural
America was already transforming in the early twentieth century. 196
Agricultural economics were changing; populations fluctuated. 197
Economic regulation of infrastructure industries is not the only policy
affecting rural communities. But as the next section shows, the transition to
deregulating certain common carriers and public utilities inflicted a deep
wound on rural communities—one that was easy to overlook from the
vantage of the city, and one that made it all the harder for rural communities
to recover from other shocks they would experience in the coming decades.
B. The New Regime, 1970s – the Present
The national rail system was not doing well by the 1950s and 60s.198
Increasingly disgruntled rail companies used freight profits to subsidize
struggling passenger lines. 199 With the Transportation Act of 1958,
Congress limited state PUCs’ jurisdiction over passenger train
discontinuances and expanded the ICC’s powers to allow discontinuances,
pushing train service further down a path to decline.200 By the late 1960s,
train passengers experienced “poor service, schedules, and abrasive
treatment” by railroads. 201 Rail companies supposedly had “deliberately
downgraded standards and discouraged patronage” because of their desire
to discontinue service on unprofitable lines.202
195. Id. (manuscript at 9).
196. Brian Thiede & Tim Slack, The Old Versus the New Economies and Their Impacts (noting
nation was transformed in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Industrial Revolution and
urbanization, moving country from majority-agrarian-rural to majority-urban for first time in 1920), in
RURAL POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 231, 232 (Ann Tickamyer, Jennifer Sherman & Jennifer
Warlick eds., 2017).
197. Harry K. Schwarzweller, Migration and the Changing Rural Scene, 44 RURAL SOCIO., no. 1,
1979, at 7.
198. See Laurence E. Tobey, Costs, Benefits, and the Future of Amtrak, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 245, 249
(1987) (explaining that after World War II, private cars, planes, and intercity buses largely displaced
demand for rail service).
199. See Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 452.
200. Transportation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 5(2), 72 Stat. 568, 571–72 (“[W]here the
State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it
by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue or change, in whole or in part, the operation or
service of any such train or ferry . . . such carrier or carriers may petition the Commission for authority
to effect such discontinuance or change.”).
201. 116 CONG. REC. 14,166 (1970).
202. Id.
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The Supreme Court set the stage for increased rates of discontinuing
common carrier services with its 1964 decision in Southern Railway Co. v.
North Carolina, 203 which tilted the scale in the decision-making process
more heavily in favor of carrier profits over potential impacts of loss of
service on local populations. Southern Railway and the ICC’s evolving
standards paved the way for railways to discontinue common carrier
service. While 1929 saw a peak of 20,000 passenger trains, “the number of
passenger trains fell by 60 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1970, only
360 intercity trains were left.”204
Demand grew for Congress to address the “national disgrace” of the
railroads.205 The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 reflected Congress’s
effort to save passenger rail service with the creation of Amtrak. 206
However, this law would usher in a new era of transportation deregulation
that would deeply exacerbate rural isolation. 207 Nevertheless, some
advocates of rural interests saw themselves as having no other choice.
Senator Frank Church of Idaho explained why he reluctantly planned to vote
in favor of the law:
I have no confidence that this legislation will really solve the
problems of providing clean, comfortable, and salable railroad
passenger service. . . .
....
. . . The theory seems to be that the Union Pacific can improve its
railroad passenger service by removing it altogether. Many
passengers who have suffered the poor service, schedules, and
abrasive treatment of the railroad may feel that way also.
Yet there are other people in rural areas who still must rely on train
transportation. . . .
....
. . . I will support the legislation. I hope that . . . it will result in
some measure of assistance to the people of my State of Idaho.208
Perhaps most significantly, the Act created the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, which superseded the ICC as the overseer of
203. S. Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
204. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 452 (footnote omitted).
205. Id.
206. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327; Tobey, supra note
198, at 254.
207. Sitaraman, Ricks & Serkin, supra note 41 (manuscript at 17) (“Deregulation prompted
railways to discontinue service along many routes and to altogether abandon many rail lines. The results
were devastating for many rural and smaller communities whose economic well-being depended on rail
service.”).
208. 116 CONG. REC. 14,166 (1970).
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passenger rail service and continued the trend of chipping away at the ICC
as protector of geographic equity.209 As private rail gave way to Amtrak,
500 additional communities lost intercity passenger train service.210 As of
the late 1980s, commentators observed that “with the exception of the
heavily traveled Boston-Washington corridor, service levels on American
passenger trains are the worst in the world.”211 Meanwhile, throughout these
developments, “thousands of small communities” were “pruned from the
system.”212
Legislators debating the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 recognized the
grave risks deregulation posed to rural communities in light of the blow loss
of airline service would inflict. Some insisted that the law included adequate
protective measures. Kansas Republican Senator James Pearson explained
that he:
had some reservations . . . related more to the problems of local air
service in those rural parts of our country where rail passenger
transportation no longer exists, where bus service is inadequate, and
where in many instances the commuter service or local air service is
really one of the last means of people achieving a sense of
communication and doing their commerce and business as is
necessary.
. . . I think [a change made to address that concern] adequately
fills the needs of the local air carriers in a new and abbreviated
certified manner with a new subsidy program.
. . . It is a phased deregulation. It is not total deregulation. . . .
....
. . . [M]y concern was for the small and isolated communities
across the country. Communities that depend upon subsidized air
service for economic growth and stability. But I now believe that the
bill adequately protects such communities.213
In a similar vein, New Mexico Republican Senator Harrison Schmitt said
during debates that his primary concern was “what would happen to the
small communities of our country.” 214 He said he believed that “small
communities will be treated most fairly” because they would have a
guarantee of air service for the first time.215 He outlined the bill’s provisions
209. Tobey, supra note 198, at 255.
210. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 453.
211. Id. (quoting William E. Thoms, Clear Track for Deregulation American Railroads, 1970–
1980, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 183, 196 (1982)) (misquotation in original).
212. Id.
213. 124 CONG. REC. 10,649–50 (1978).
214. Id. at 10,652.
215. Id.
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that would protect small communities, including direct subsidies, a
guarantee of air service for ten years, a requirement for an airline wishing
to abandon a small community to be replaced, and a new certification for
local air carriers with more liberal regulations.216
Others were less optimistic. South Dakota Democratic Senator George
McGovern characterized airline deregulation as a “grim scenario” with
virtually immeasurable downstream effects on municipal airport
investments and airline industry employees with specialized skills.217 But
“[t]he focal point” of his concern was “the air service for smaller
communities.”218 He anticipated a mass exit of rural service providers and a
deterioration of service where it still existed, emphasizing that policymakers
should look to what would happen after the ten-year phaseout.219 Advocates
for small communities also testified before Congress, “provid[ing] example
after example of the discriminatory fares and deteriorating service resulting
from deregulation,” trends which would fall disproportionately on small,
remote localities across the country.220
As McGovern predicted, the airline industry followed in step with the
rail industry in curtailing service to rural communities. The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 allowed “[a]ll but the last carrier in a market” to
be free to discontinue service at will.221 Congress did establish a ten-year
program of federal subsidies to provide air service to impacted small
communities, although it was generally “alleged that small communities had
little to fear from deregulation” because of some policymakers’ insistence
that regional markets would adjust to meet needs. 222 Yet, 40% of small
communities experienced a loss of air service after deregulation. 223
Meanwhile, ticket prices increased disproportionately for those
communities, in addition to a rise in other convenience and safety
concerns.224
Common carrier exits contributed to a demonstrable downward cycle for
these communities, and many of these trends came before the ten-year

216. Id.
217. Id. at 10,660.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 10,660–61.
220. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 457 (discussing impacts in California, the
Midwest, the Dakotas, the Carolinas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West
Virginia).
221. Id. at 454.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 457.
224. Id. at 455–57.
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federal subsidy to ensure service to small communities ran out.225 Regional
access to commerce is in large part dependent on regional access to
affordable transportation; the vast majority of major businesses at the time
indicated in a survey that they would not locate in an area without access to
air transportation.226 With a national shift away from manufacturing in the
1980s toward the service sector, large employers began to require
sophisticated communications and information systems, including highquality air service, which had come to be viewed as a comparable necessity
to electricity and telephones—prompting some to argue that air service
should be treated as a public utility. 227 Just as Western ghost towns
proliferated as a result of discontinued rail service, a bankrupt airline could
create a ghost town. While some praised these deregulatory efforts as
laudable moves toward efficiency, other commentary at the time lamented
the retreat of critical public protections.228
Finally, “[w]ith the passenger trains having vanished from rural
America, and with commercial aircraft no longer landing at many small
town airports, the only means of public intercity transport left was the
bus.” 229 But, following in step, the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
expanded carriers’ ability to abandon or discontinue service and raise fares.
Local residents could attempt to forestall abandonment by proving that a
closure would leave them without alternative means of public transport. Yet,
the ICC consistently sided with companies, prompting the New York
Department of Transportation to claim that the ICC showed “a total
disregard and lack of concern for the welfare of the riding public.”230 A mere
eleven months after deregulation, 1,294 locations in forty states lost or were
proposed to lose service, 776 of whom lost intercity service entirely.231 Most

225. Meyer, supra note 4, at 219 (“Not surprisingly, carriers began to drop service on unprofitable
routes. Direct subsidies failed to stem the tide of rural retrenchment. The result has been the welldocumented isolation of rural communities.” (footnotes omitted)).
226. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 458.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 459 (“[S]ome measure of public protection is more than justified. And who else but a
public agency can serve as the ultimate arbiter, stabilizing the kind of erratic market conditions that
brought about the creation of these agencies in the first place?” (quoting SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN
TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 250 (1983)).
229. Id.; see also Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 366 (discussing measures to
deregulate the trucking industry in the 1990s).
230. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 460 (quoting Household Goods Transportation
and Bus Regulatory Reform Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 99th Cong. 145 (1985) [hereinafter Household Goods Hearing]
(statement of John K. Mladinov)).
231. Id. at 461 (citing Household Goods Hearing, supra note 230, at 2 (statement of Sen. Larry
Pressler)).
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of those communities had populations of less than 10,000.232 In short, “[i]n
less than [one] year, almost [one] million people lost their bus service.”233
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), which formally devolved highway planning to the
states. 234 In 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
mandated statewide transportation planning, which included some of the
first planning initiatives for rural areas.235 Yet, today, rural communities
remain isolated from national transportation networks. Anyone who has
sought to take a bus, train, or plane to a remote or small town has
experienced the expense and inconvenience associated with modern rural
transportation access.236
As the regulation of rural telecommunications mirrored the regulation of
rural transportation, so did deregulation, although the legal pathway was a
bit different. In the 1940s, AT&T’s size and dominance drew the attention
of the U.S. Department of Justice, which argued as early as a 1949 lawsuit
that AT&T was in violation of the Sherman Act and that its lack of
competition undermined the goals of public regulation.237 AT&T agreed in
a 1956 consent decree that it would limit its activities to the
telecommunications sector, license its technologies to competitors, and
subject itself to competition from other firms.238 It jostled for power with
competitors in judicial and agency processes for the next twenty years when
the political tides were turning even further away from the natural monopoly
model. 1984 then saw the largest corporate dismantling in the history of
antitrust, when AT&T was forced to divest itself of Bell operating
companies.239
Like with transportation, deregulation of the telecommunications sector
was disproportionately hard on rural communities. Specifically, Dempsey
wrote in 1989:
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Household Goods Hearing, supra note 230, at 2 (statement of Sen. Larry
Pressler)).
234. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–240, 105 Stat.
1914.
235. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
236. See Susan Stellin, Small Airports, Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2011/03/01/business/01airports.html [https://perma.cc/3GUZ-YQ2H].
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3; United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135–36 (D.D.C.
1982) (“On January 14, 1949, the government filed an action . . . against . . . the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, Inc. . . . alleg[ing] that the defendants had monopolized and conspired to
restrain trade . . . in violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act . . . .”), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001;
see also Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 MC., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959); Hush-A-Phone
Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
238. Dempsey, supra note 157, at 539.
239. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 226–27; Dempsey, supra note 157, at 531, 552
(describing breakup of AT&T as “most significant single event in American telecommunications
history”).
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Deregulation . . . affected rural telephone bills as telephone
companies passed on more of the actual service cost to their
customers. In the past, federal regulation supported rural subsidies.
Under rate-averaging requirements, the FCC required telephone
companies to charge urban and rural customers the same for service,
despite the fact that fewer customers were available to cover fixed
costs. . . . Adequate telecommunications services at a reasonable
price are essential for economic growth. . . .
[R]ural telephone bills have increased. The process of
deregulation could hasten depopulation of rural areas and further the
congestion of urban areas because of the greater availability and
lower costs of essential services in urban areas.240
Universal service is still a legal mandate for phone service providers
today, both wired and cellular. 241 Yet, rural communities have been left
behind in this sector as well. Dempsey observed in his writing thirty years
ago that rural communities were being left out of the “technology
revolution”; that rural communities might “never be strung to the national
fiber optics system”; and that generally, “whatever benefits urban regions
of the nation may enjoy in terms of new technology and increased
competition, these benefits appear not to be trickling down to the rural
regions of the nation.”242
Replacing
the
Telecommunications
Act
of
1934,
the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 brought “[t]he cornerstone of
telecommunications deregulation in the United States.”243 Ironically, then,
the telecommunications sector was turned loose just as the seeds were
planted for the internet to grow into one of the most important fundamental
services of modern society. The “public interest” standard, once
encompassing only the needs of “subscribers,” “broadened to include
private business and the market. Thus, the public interest morphed into a
competitive economic environment.”244 In reducing the role for the FCC’s
oversight, the Act broke up traditional regulated phone monopolies and
gave state public utility commissions responsibility for ensuring universal
service and for overseeing pricing.
The 1996 Act mandated funding for rural schools, libraries, and
healthcare facilities’ telecommunications technology. But it “left out low240. Dempsey, supra note 157, at 580–81 (footnotes omitted).
241. Universal Service, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/universal-service [https://perma.cc/2J
UB-BPTV].
242. Dempsey, supra note 157, at 581–82.
243. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; Kozak, supra note 178,
at 17.
244. Kozak, supra note 178, at 17 (footnote omitted).
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income households and high cost regions, including rural areas.”245 As a
result of relaxed regulations, some rural regions were left “with antiquated
telephone technology” that technically meets modern federal requirements
for universal service, but still “provides a menu of services far below those
available in urban areas.” 246 Again perhaps ironically, the current
framework does use the old tool of cross-subsidization to enhance rural
access to broadband internet, but most commentators agree that this tool
alone, particularly as it is implemented, does not do nearly enough to ensure
universal, equitable service to this critical amenity that serves as the
gateway for access to many important downstream uses.247
C. Rural Abandonment as a Series of Market Failures
Many of today’s challenging rural conditions can be traced back to
deregulation. Rural communities other than those considered amenity-rich
have experienced deterioration as populations have migrated to cities,
regional employers have shuttered, local governments have lost tax revenue
critical to providing basic services, and infrastructure has aged. This
downward cycle of economic non-development is precisely what
policymakers and rural advocates have feared since the debates over the
ICA: when necessary infrastructure services are not required to provide
service to less profitable places, they do not. The move toward service
providers’ discretionary service provision has contributed to the
concentration of services in smaller geographic areas, regional economic
turmoil, the depopulation of the countryside, and exacerbated geographic
wealth inequality.
Commentary on rural communities today has some consistent themes.
Rural communities have been “abandoned,” “left behind,” made “strangers
in their own land.” 248 White rural residents are portrayed as resentful,
enraged, and alienated. In searching for the causes of this alienation,
commentary often points to two factors. The first is the disproportionate
economic growth that has benefited cities, associated with the loss of
traditional livelihoods that have contributed to rural obsolescence.249 The
second is increasing demographic diversity and cultural progressivism,

245.

Id. at 19 (citing CORNELIA BUTLER FLORA & JAN L. FLORA, RURAL COMMUNITIES: LEGACY
216 (2d ed. 2004)).
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Christopher Ali, We Need a National Rural Broadband Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/opinion/rural-broadband-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/TM4
W-7HNS].
248. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4 passim.
249. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 206–12, 217–20.
AND CHANGE

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss3/6

2021]

ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RURAL AMERICA

779

much of which is seen in cities, making disproportionately older, white rural
residents feel culturally estranged and angry.250
As to the first factor, ample commentary points to globalization and
automation as drivers of rural obsolescence, a narrative which prior work
has challenged. 251 Critically, deregulation remains an under-examined
player lurking in the background of both the economic and cultural
marginalization factors. Deregulating the transportation and
telecommunications industries literally isolated rural communities, cutting
them off from the rest of the country and exacerbating regional financial
burdens. 252 This not only excluded them from national and regional
economic activity, but also excised them from the broader cultural
ecosystem. What was to be expected after rural communities were cut off
from trains, planes, buses, and their access to communications systems
made more expensive, other than economic stagnation and cultural
estrangement?
Yet, the need to cultivate rural America remains. As Laurie Ristino has
observed in Surviving Climate Change in America: Toward a Rural
Resilience Framework, “[r]ural America has a key role to play in our
national resilience because it is the locus of our nation’s ecosystem services,
including food and fiber provisioning.” 253 Others have observed that
transitions to renewable energy will require drawing more upon rural land
and workers in light of the substantial footprint such installations often
require. 254 In addition to the provision of food, energy, and fibers, as
mentioned in this Article’s introduction, rural communities have important
potential as better-supported stewards of eighty percent of the country’s
land mass, such as in the management of forestland to prevent or mitigate
devastating wildfires. 255 Other important roles for rural communities

250. WUTHNOW, supra note 4, at 2, 11, 142.
251. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 196 (arguing that several decades of legislative and policy
decisions resulted in foreseeable losses for rural communities that have been rationalized in the name of
“the greater good”).
252. See Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 353–54.
253. Ristino, supra note 9, at 522–23; see also Megan Galey & A. Bryan Endres, Locating the
Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17 NEXUS: J.L. & POL’Y 3 (2012) (discussing need to
fundamentally rethink food system and relationships between agricultural policies and rural community
economic development); Christy Anderson Brekken, South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine: The
Eighth Circuit Abandons Federalism, Precedent, and Family Farmers, 22 LAW & INEQ. 347, 349 (2004)
(discussing relationships among farm consolidation and corporate farming, reduction in farm jobs, and
rural economic development).
254. See Welton & Eisen, supra note 21, at 360–61.
255. See Miller et al., supra note 14, at 44–45.
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include maintaining outdoor recreation opportunities, safeguarding
priceless heritage sites, and helping conserve or manage wildlife.256
In light of deregulation’s role in undercutting the important services rural
America is uniquely positioned to provide—and few would suggest that our
current food and energy systems are acceptable as is—infrastructure
industries’ abandonment of rural communities should be viewed as a series
of market failures. Despite developments attempting to maintain rural
service provision even after deregulation, rural communities today are
relatively isolated both from national transportation networks and national
telecommunications networks. Where they are connected, the services they
receive may be less robust or more expensive.257
This isolation and its associated harms to rural communities’
contributions to society could be categorized under two different versions
of “market failure.” Generally, “[e]conomists use the term market failure to
describe less than optimally functioning markets.” 258 Markets are only
allowed to operate based on the understanding that markets “enhance
overall well-being” by moving toward optimal allocations of resources.259
The failure of markets to furnish rural communities with adequate
infrastructure services could be considered as either or both of two different
types of market failure. First, consumers may fall victim to market failures
in a variety of conditions, including a “lack of choice due to a paucity of
alternative sellers.”260 That is, if consumers demand a good or service but
that good or service is in low supply, a market failure is present.261 Rural
communities certainly exemplify this today; if one simply attempts to
purchase a plane ticket for a remote locality or nearby, the likely high price
of the ticket illustrates how rural communities bear this burden.
A second version of market failure is the phenomenon known as the
tragedy of the commons, or a failure to protect public goods.262 The tragedy
256. Cf. Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 345,
388 (2006) (listing positive externalities associated with agricultural activities, including wildlife
habitat, biodiversity, and cultural heritage conservation).
257. Christopher Terry, Localism as a Solution to Market Failure: Helping the FCC Comply with
the Telecommunications Act, 71 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 327, 330, 348 (2019) (deeming as a market failure
the fact that “in many small and medium-sized American communities, market competition among
media outlets is not fostering localism,” meaning that “[t]he unregulated marketplace falls short . . . in
providing local content to citizens of many American communities . . . fail[ing] to supply adequate
competition, diversity, and localism”).
258. Todd S. Aagaard & Andrew N. Kleit, The Complexity Dilemma in Policy Market Design, 30
DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1, 9 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
259. Id.
260. Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in “Unconscionable”
Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 918 (2020).
261. See Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 762
(2019).
262. Aagaard & Kleit, supra note 258, at 11–12.
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of the commons arises when markets fail to protect or sustain goods or
services that are important to everyone.263 In light of rural communities’
ongoing importance to the nation—and their close relationship with the
classic example of the common good, the natural environment—markets’
failures to sustain rural communities in and of themselves should be
considered a tragedy of the commons. In other words, rural socioeconomic
decline in and of itself reflects a tragedy of the commons—the classic
market failure.
This argument does raise a fundamental question about rural
revitalization: what about those communities that may never have served
some form of national interest, or do not seem like they are well-positioned
to? Should the approaches discussed in the next section still apply to them,
or do we draw the line at some point in terms of a particular community’s
worthiness? For instance, former coal mining communities in Central
Appalachia once contributed to the national energy grid; perhaps
infrastructure markets’ abandonment of them was a market failure during
that era, but it is not necessarily clear now that this particular region
warrants intervention, at least based on this rationale.264
This question implicates several important issues. First, greater
recognition of the deep problems with the ways food and energy are
produced could inform a substantially different vision of a possible rural
future.265 Both sectors require substantial restructuring. If food production
is to be sustainable from an environmental and public health standpoint, it
cannot continue to rely so fundamentally on monoculture cash crops,
concentrated animal feeding operations, and other forms of hazardous
industrialized agriculture. 266 Similarly, the need for low-carbon energy
production is urgent, and will require a substantial land use footprint.267
Enhanced wildlife and ecosystem conservation is also a pressing national
263. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (2007).
264. Cf. ADELE C. MORRIS, NOAH KAUFMAN & SIDDHI DOSHI, THE RISK OF FISCAL COLLAPSE
IN COAL-RELIANT COMMUNITIES 31 (2019) (discussing massive investments that will be necessary to
avoid economic collapse for formerly coal-reliant communities); Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 300–07
(arguing that intervention in coal-reliant communities is ethically necessary).
265. Nathan A. Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, The Butz Stops Here: Why the Food Movement
Needs to Rethink Agricultural History, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 12, 12–13 (2017); J.B. Ruhl, Farms,
Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 348–49 (2000); Welton
& Eisen, supra note 21, at 331.
266. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 229–35 (discussing negative externalities associated with
industrialized agriculture); Mary Jane Angelo, Food Security, Industrialized Agriculture, and a
Changing Global Climate: Perspectives on the United States and Cuba, 29 FLA. J. INT’L L. 131 (2017);
Terence J. Centner, Enforcing Environmental Regulations: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,
69 MO. L. REV. 697, 698 (2004).
267. Welton & Eisen, supra note 21, 360–61; James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy
and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 659, 738–39 (2019).
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need. 268 Rural communities, by their nature being population-sparse and
proximal to more land, will need to be a central part of these solutions.
Thus, for any given community, the question should not be, “do they
contribute to national interests?,” but rather, “could they contribute to
national interests?”269 Again, this raises the point made earlier that these
proposals are not seeking to recreate the rural America of the past, but to
envision its role for the future. This question would in turn raise questions
about how rural community economic development should be pursued more
generally. Although prior work has argued that a vision for any given
region’s economic future must involve input from residents affected, 270
there is of course an important role for state and federal actors to
contemplate and incentivize rural activities that contribute to national
welfare.
Mobility, political stability, sovereignty, and ethical concerns are four
additional considerations that factor into the question of intervention,
regardless of a given region’s contributions to national interests. Perhaps an
existing community has nothing to offer—it would be difficult for a
policymaker or other decisionmaker to conclude as much, but maybe it
could be true.
In that case, asking four additional questions could help inform a path
forward. First, are there barriers to mobility that keep the residents of this
place from relocating to another region with a higher quality of life? 271
Second, does non-intervention nevertheless pose a threat to political
stability that comes with destabilized socioeconomic welfare, as was
arguably illustrated with high rates of rural support for President Trump?272
Third, in the context of Native American reservations, which are mostly
rural, is the given community imbued with sovereignty as an independent
nation such that coercing relocation by neglect would be tantamount to

268. Karen Bradshaw, Expropriating Habitat, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 77, 82–87 (2019); Kirk
Siegler, This Land is . . . Cut Under Trump’s Budget?, NPR (May 23, 2017, 5:44 PM), https://www.npr.
org/2017/05/23/529741146/this-land-is-cut-under-trumps-budget
[https://perma.cc/W38H-7CPW]
(discussing Trump administration’s efforts to cut Department of Interior funding for wildlife and
ecosystem management).
269. See Karl N. Stauber, Why Invest in Rural America—And How? A Critical Public Policy
Question for the 21st Century, FED. RSRV. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Second Quarter 2001, at 33,
34 (arguing that federal rural policies are “unfocused, outdated, and ineffective,” and should focus more
on supporting rural middle class and addressing rural poverty while also pursuing environmental
conservation).
270. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 314, 324–28; Ann Eisenberg, Addressing Rural Blight: Lessons
from West Virginia and WV LEAP, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 513 (2016).
271. See Schleicher, supra note 7, at 111–32; Anderson, supra note 2, 524–25.
272. See Jon Emont, The Growing Urban-Rural Divide Around the World, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/electoral-college-trump-argentinamalaysia-japan-clinton/512153/ [https://perma.cc/3AKL-HR52].
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destroying a country?273 And, fourth, could some other deep attachment to
place also warrant against letting the community die, even if it does not
benefit collective welfare?274 One would be hard-pressed to find a locality
where at least one of the answers to these questions is not in the affirmative.
But to the extent a particular locality could be deemed beyond help, the
struggles of the residents there would still implicate broader questions of
non-place-specific problems with deep socioeconomic inequality.
In short, while this discussion does insist upon the import of ongoing
rural contributions to society, it is not necessarily the case that rural
communities should be mandated to earn their keep, so to speak, in order to
merit access to infrastructure and other basic necessities. The next section
examines what type of steps could be taken to counteract the trends of rural
infrastructure abandonment, both through the lens of concern for the rural
consumer and because of concern for common goods and services
associated with rural livelihoods.
III. CORRECTING RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE MARKETS IN THE MODERN
ERA
One would be hard-pressed to argue that that the regulatory apparatus of
the past—relying fundamentally on mechanisms such as universal service
mandates, cross-subsidization, tariffs, and service bundling—can simply be
revived as a part of a reform effort to help overcome the barrier of rural
diseconomies of scale.275 Cross-subsidizing telephone rates, for example,
may have worked a century ago, but would be less feasible in today’s
political climate. 276 The approach has been used in the context of
broadband, but is largely viewed as not going far enough to achieve the aim
of universal service. 277 This suggests that creative, novel thinking about
market interventions in the modern context are warranted. This Part argues
that if we are truly to understand and meet the needs of rural communities—
273. Cf. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1531, 1556–67 (2019) (arguing that Indigenous land tenure policies must ensure
protections for tribal sovereignty); Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race,
and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 494 (2017) (Native nations are sovereigns with
direct relationship with federal government, which situates them differently from other minority groups).
274. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 212 (questioning whether it is ethical to “mandate mobility,”
especially in light of how structural factors created precarious rural communities).
275. See Rahman, supra note 51, at 1690 (acknowledging that prior regulatory system cannot
simply be resurrected).
276. See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden
Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1234–35 (2018) (noting transparency concerns associated with crosssubsidization); Rahman, supra note 17, at 931 (noting, in contrast to Progressive era, that regulators
today operate in an environment of prevailing skepticism and unease about public actors’ efficacy and
accountability).
277. Cf. Ali, supra note 247.
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which we should do not just for their sake, but for everyone’s—our
understanding of infrastructure will need to be broadened, which will also
require a recalibration of the balance between public and private interests.
A new scholarly movement has sought to revitalize the idea of the public
utility and to examine what a modernized version of infrastructural
regulation could and should look like.278 K. Sabeel Rahman has developed
a framework for conceptualizing “the new utilities”—that is, contemplating
where the balance between public and private interests should stand today
and what today’s version of interventions into markets, particularly for
those markets affecting services thought of as “infrastructure,” ought to
be.279 Rahman argues that the 1870s–1970s regulatory toolkit can actually
be seen as broader than it is often characterized. It involved “a range of
interventions aimed at addressing the problem of power over
infrastructure,” but did not necessarily insist on any particular approach.280
Thus, even initially, the concept of regulatory interventions “was essentially
fluid” and could change alongside changes in technological and economic
conditions.281 Rahman therefore argues that the old vision of regulation does
not need to be resurrected by way of rote mimicry in the post-deregulatory
era. Rather, there is a need to build upon the original approaches and
contemplate “a more modern and flexible way of adapting public utility
traditions to contemporary infrastructure.”282
Rahman’s framework has unique applicability to the rural question
because it offers guidance as to when and how policymakers should seek to
overcome the natural rural handicap of diseconomies of scale by intervening
into markets. 283 This Part draws upon Rahman’s framework to articulate
possible pathways that could be used to help redirect markets to rural
communities and when such intervention is warranted. 284 In laying the
foundation for his proposed framework for regulating infrastructure,
Rahman explains that “a variety of tools” including “oversight, structuralist
regulations, and public options” should be considered in the arsenal of
278. Rahman, supra note 17, at 914 (suggesting that legal historians have recently revived interest
in the public utility tradition to regulate infrastructure).
279. Rahman, supra note 51, at 1641–45.
280. Rahman, supra note 17, at 915.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 932.
283. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are of course a variety of policy approaches for
attempting to overcome the handicap of economies of scale. The approaches discussed here are not
intended to be mutually exclusive with those options. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4,
at 38–40 (discussing consolidation, co-location, merging, remote delivery, and other approaches to
services to help enhance and expand rural service provision); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 218–39
(discussing potential policy approaches to struggles of rural local governments to effectively tackle
problem of widespread vacant, abandoned, and dilapidated properties).
284. Rahman, supra note 17, at 932.
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approaches for regulating infrastructure today.285 These tools should then be
applied to sectors with certain infrastructure-like characteristics.
Rahman’s framework includes three analytical steps to determine the
optimal approach to a given question about whether and how to regulate a
sector as “infrastructure.” The first step is to diagnose what counts as
“infrastructure.” He defines infrastructural goods and services as having
three defining characteristics. The first is that “infrastructure arises where
there might be some form of economies of scale in production.” 286 The
second factor “is the degree to which the good or service unlocks a wide
range of downstream uses.”287 And the third is “the risk of vulnerability to
private power or domination.”288
Once a good or service is categorized as infrastructure, the second step
is to draw from “a flexible range of tools” in order to assure fair and equal
access to that good or service. 289 These tools do include the regulatory
oversight typically associated with the old regulatory regime. Describing
this approach as among the “central legacies” of utilities regulation,
Rahman characterizes it as imposing “affirmative obligations to provide
services to marginalized or overlooked constituencies, or to comply with
legal standards of nondiscrimination.” 290 But other tools should be
considered as well. Rahman proposes “structuralist regulation” as one
option, meaning “attempts to transform the corporate structures of the firms
themselves providing these infrastructural goods as a way to preempt
exploitative or exclusionary treatment by reducing potential conflicts of
interest.”291 A third main tool Rahman highlights is the possibility of public
options, in which “public actors themselves directly provide the good or
service in question.”292
The third and final step is to “develop a governance regime that assures
that such utility-style regulation is itself administered in an accountable and
public-interested manner.” 293 Rahman proposes that policymakers today
should design regulatory bodies and public utility agencies “in ways that
institutionalize more systematic—and flexible—internal checks and
balances.”294 In other words, a modern reconceptualization of infrastructure
governance should seek to overcome the issues of the old regime that
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 932.
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undermined its accountability and legitimacy with constituents and
detractors.
Rahman’s framework reveals a few important points for considering the
rural relationship to infrastructure. The first is that a good or service that
might not be considered “infrastructure” in an urban setting might count as
infrastructure in a rural one. Take, for example, a remote town’s last grocery
store, perhaps a Walmart or a Dollar Store. In an urban setting, such a store
would be unlikely to meet the conditions under Rahman’s first step
characterizing infrastructure. The Walmart’s “scale” would be of little
significance. Although food deserts certainly exist in urban settings, local
consumers would have alternative options within some municipal
geographic range for buying their necessities if the Walmart left. This means
the Walmart’s departure would have finite effects on downstream uses,
although it could of course create substantial problems for people. And
because of local residents’ alternative options, even if inconvenient, their
vulnerability to the abuse of private power by the Walmart would also be
finite.
But in a rural setting, it is possible that a single remaining Walmart in a
town otherwise devoid of grocery stores should in fact be considered
infrastructure. The scale of the Walmart does matter in a rural context: are
there enough local residents and consumers to justify the expenses
associated with operating the Walmart? In a sense, the Walmart does need
to be “at scale” or it will consider leaving. Second, in a rural setting, the
Walmart unlocks downstream uses just as much as a more traditional form
of infrastructure such as clean water or electricity; if there is no reasonably
close alternative way to procure food, people will be unable to live in the
rural locality at all. Finally, the risk of vulnerability to private domination
in this context is heightened due to the imbalance of power between the
Walmart and the residents. The Walmart can leave and incur relatively
minimal losses in the spectrum of considerations for the Walmart
corporation. The rural town losing its Walmart, by contrast, stands to
unravel completely with the Walmart’s closure, as was the case when this
happened in the former coal-mining community of McDowell County, West
Virginia, in 2016.295
As this example illustrates, policymakers seeking to address the problem
of rural infrastructure and diseconomies of scale may need to expand their
understanding of what constitutes infrastructure. That is, infrastructure does
295. Ed Pilkington, What Happened When Walmart Left, THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2017, 12:55
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/09/what-happened-when-walmart-left [https://per
ma.cc/JQT5-QTJ7]; Jessica Lilly & Roxy Todd, What Happens When Walmart Closes in One Coal
Community?, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.wvpublic.org/post/what-happens-whe
n-walmart-closes-one-coal-community#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/7L58-YKEA].
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not necessarily need to involve multimillion-dollar projects that will take
years to complete. State or federal legislatures could intervene in this
particular infrastructural sector by making it harder for a resource like a
Walmart to abandon its constituents, so to speak. This idea is not as novel
and radical as it may sound. Social scientists have recently argued,
consistent with Rahman’s framework and this analysis, that state-run
grocery stores should be considered an option for meeting national food
needs.296 The authors point to state-run alcohol stores as an illustration of
the fact that our legal-economic traditions do already account for such an
approach. 297 The authors also acknowledge that such an initiative would
require a thicker conception of the role for policy to intervene into markets
and recalibrate the balance between private interests and public ones,
shifting the scale more towards the latter.298
Thus, an initial step for understanding the role for economic regulation
in rural America is that rural diseconomies of scale mean that the concept
of “infrastructure” may need to take up more space than it would in a place
with higher population density, depending upon how one wants to define
whether a particular sector needs to operate “at scale”—which, in a sense,
any profit-making enterprise does. Other examples of goods and services
that should be considered infrastructure in a rural setting may include access
to primary care physicians and lawyers, access to a gas station within a
reasonable distance, and access to a pharmacy. Of course, rural
communities are already challenged to access the goods and services widely
accepted as traditional infrastructure, including building code enforcement,
police protection, schools, libraries, and clean water.299 These conditions
alone suggest the need for more robust intervention into these sectors in
order to ensure that residents’ basic needs are met. Some today would argue
that policy does not have a role to play in meeting basic needs anymore. But
this Article’s discussion highlights the fact that such a view is in fact the
novel and radical one, while economic regulation with a view to the public
interest has far deeper and more longstanding roots in the U.S. legal
tradition.300
How might we apply Rahman’s framework to the more traditional,
national-network sectors of telecommunications and transportation as they
concern rural communities today? Both clearly meet the conditions to
296. See Justin Sean Myers & Christine C. Caruso, Towards a Public Food Infrastructure:
Closing the Food Gap Through State-Run Grocery Stores, 72 GEOFORUM 30 (2016).
297. Id. at 32.
298. Id.; cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, Black, Poor, and Gone: Civil Rights Law’s Inner-City Crisis, 54
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 629, 651 (2019) (describing grocery stores as “key institutions” in contrast to
“infrastructure systems”).
299. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 210.
300. See Boyd, supra note 15, at 750–68.
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constitute “infrastructure”: both require scale; both are fundamental
gateways to almost unquantifiable downstream uses; and both may be
influenced by private caprice or domination.301 Thus, in this context, the
trickier question lies in the choices among the tools: what role is there for
regulatory oversight, structural regulation, or a public option—or perhaps
other approaches—for addressing the urban/rural digital divide and the gap
in access to affordable, reliable transportation?
Far more attention of late has focused on the question of deploying
broadband internet to rural areas than the question of rural transportation
access. The legal framework today is still based on the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which established the general mandate to “promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher
quality services” and “encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.”302 Under the Act, the FCC regulates two
types of entity: (1) telecommunications carriers and (2) information-service
providers. This distinction is quite important; telecommunications services
are still bound by the Communications Act of 1934’s regulations for
common carriers, involving more stringent obligations to strive for
universal service at just and reasonable rates. 303 Although the FCC
categorized broadband as an information service in a controversial 2000
decision, it reversed course in 2015, a decision which broadband service
providers unsuccessfully challenged.304
These developments may have seemed like they were going in the right
direction for rural access. But in 2018, the Trump administration’s FCC
published its rule repealing net neutrality and recategorizing broadband as
an information service.305 Significantly for rural communities, this repeal
reversing broadband’s status as a public utility minimized its importance to
the public. 306 Advocates of rural development emphasized rural
301. See, e.g., Johanna D. Hollingsworth, Note, Is There a Doctor in the House? How Dismantling
Barriers to Telemedicine Practice Can Improve Healthcare Access for Rural Residents, 62 HOW. L.J.
653, 656 (2019) (discussing downstream uses stemming from broadband access); Amie Alexander,
Note, Utility Law—All Hands on Deck: Bringing Broadband Home to Rural Arkansas, 40 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 401, 401–03 (2018) (discussing downstream uses stemming from broadband
access).
302. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
303. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005).
304. Id. at 977–78; Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5610 (2015)
(finding that broadband Internet access service is a “telecommunications service” and therefore subject
to regulations within Title II of Communications Act protecting consumer access); see also FCC
Releases Open Internet Order, FCC (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-openinternet-order [https://perma.cc/XSR3-2EH8]; U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 700 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (upholding Open Internet Order).
305. Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7,852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 8, 20).
306. Alexander, supra note 301, at 410.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss3/6

2021]

ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RURAL AMERICA

789

communities’ particular vulnerability to higher rates dictated by “a cashdriven internet.” 307 This change placed rural small businesses at a
competitive disadvantaged and made it more likely for local, independent
service providers to be priced out of competition.308
Thus, the obvious choice in the context of broadband infrastructure is
that broadband must be considered just that: infrastructure, or in other
words, a public utility. But it is not clear that arguably outdated common
carrier standards would go far enough to ensure adequate rural access. The
most ambitious legislative proposal to date arguably embodies Rahman’s
third tool, or placing more of infrastructure provision directly into public
hands. The proposed Rural Broadband Improvement Act of 2007 would
have amended the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 to create an Office of
Rural Broadband Initiatives within the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
established an Undersecretary for Rural Broadband Initiatives, and
conducted nationwide outreach to rural areas with a view to marshaling
federal resources to achieve deployment. 309 This, perhaps is what a
modernized vision for rural infrastructure looks like, drawing on past
models based on today’s needs and resources.
In the transportation context, Lisa Pruitt has consistently argued that
inequitable access to transportation is a critical, underappreciated aspect of
rural marginalization.310 But few have examined the legal structures shaping
today’s rural transportation networks. This may be because modern
transportation law is relatively esoteric and technical. Legislation passed in
recent, post-deregulation decades—including the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century, and the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for
the 21st Century—established frameworks for statewide planning for the
first time in the history of national transportation law.311 The most recent
development in this area is the U.S. Department of Transportation’s rule on
Statewide and Nonmetropolitan Transportation Planning and Metropolitan
Transportation Planning, finalized and published in May 2016, which
provided guidance to Rural Transportation Planning Organizations. 312
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Rural Broadband Improvement Act, H.R. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007).
310. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST.
338, 365–66 (2008); Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 421,
433–34; Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Parents, Judging Place: Poverty, Rurality, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L. REV. 95, 125–30 (2012); Pruitt & Showman, supra note 4, at
486; see also Edward W. De Barbieri, Community Engagement and Transportation Equity, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1103 (2017).
311. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5310.
312. Statewide and Nonmetropolitan Transportation Planning; Metropolitan Transportation
Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 34,050 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 613).
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Overall, the modern trend has been toward devolved, coordinated planning
at the regional, state, and local level. One federal report described the rural
transportation system as “really a system of disparate parts” and “very
decentralized,” with “actual operations . . . primarily a local
responsibility.”313
On its face, this seems problematic from the perspective of national
infrastructure. Although avenues for local input are certainly desirable,314
national networks such as highways, airlines, and trains are unlikely to be
managed well or with a view to equitable access if they are navigating
(literally) differing patchworks of laws across jurisdictions.315 This need for
uniformity, consistency, and contemplation of transportation infrastructure
beyond local and regional transit speaks to the need for heavier federal
involvement. It seems, therefore, as if Rahman’s first tool—the legacy
approach of increased regulatory oversight—would be the appropriate
approach in the transportation context.
Interestingly, at least two of Rahman’s tools start to emerge as steps in a
decision-making flowchart: where private markets or devolved decisionmaking are failing, as in the transportation context, increased federal
regulatory oversight is a natural first step. Where regulatory oversight has
been failing, as in the telecommunications context, increased direct public
involvement in service provision seems like a natural second step. Both
reveal points on a spectrum of beginning to tilt the scale, as it becomes clear
that such tilting is needed, in the direction of the public interest over private
interests.
In any case, these three examples—telecommunications, transportation,
and grocery stores—illustrate some of the many forms of infrastructure that
rural communities need but cannot necessarily access organically through
market operations. Service providers would, of course, bear additional costs
associated with increased service provision for rural communities, which
would likely be less profitable than urban operations. The political tensions
of the prior regulatory era would be revived if attempts to rein in private
power were pursued, or if public providers increased competition with
private ones, as has been shown with modern litigation over broadband
standards. The question of how to approach rural diseconomies of scale thus
raises fundamental questions about the role of government and policy in
shaping daily life; these questions are ultimately questions about what our
313. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., PLANNING FOR TRANSPORTATION IN RURAL AREAS 8 (2001).
314. Id. at 40 (outlining benefits of involving local stakeholders, such as better-informed plans
and increased trust in government).
315. Cf. id. at 10 (“[T]ransportation investments with the highest returns appear to be those that
can produce what are called ‘network effects’ . . . [which] raise the productivity of the system as a
whole.”).
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collective priorities are. In light of the widespread suffering outside the
country’s urban centers today, the answer simply cannot be that the balance
that has been struck today is the correct one, either morally or pragmatically.
CONCLUSION
The past several decades have revealed that rural communities are not
self-sustaining. But the natural handicap posed by rural diseconomies of
scale does not necessitate that rural communities are unsustainable. Rural
communities are unique. They are at the forefront of most livelihoods that
deal in large stretches of land and engage with natural resources. Many of
those livelihoods are in the business of producing or protecting public
necessities, including food, fibers, energy, wildlife, and ecosystem
management. Rural communities are also part of a national political
ecosystem with an interconnected fate. Thus, we neglect, isolate, and
unravel rural communities to our own collective detriment.
The prior regulatory era showed that market interventions to overcome
the challenge posed by diseconomies of scale bore fruit in the form of betterserved, more prosperous rural communities. Rural communities today are
not necessarily under-served by all markets providing services that would
fall under the label of “infrastructure.” But rural isolation from national
transportation and telecommunications networks today, in light of ongoing
rural importance and harm to rural consumers, should be considered a series
of market failures. Rural isolation can go even deeper than this, too;
abandonment by a grocery store can be the nail in the coffin of a particular
community’s fate. Thus, a broader conception of infrastructure and the role
for economic regulation is warranted if we are to understand and meet the
needs of rural America. While reviving the exact models of the past may be
unrealistic or undesirable, this analysis establishes that modernized
interventions must be considered in order to weave rural communities back
into the national fabric of the networks that connect us.
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